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MY CUSTOMER'S KEEPER: THE SEARCH 

FOR A UNIVERSAL SUITABILITY 





RICHARD J. WIRTH* 
INTRODUCTION 
As consumers, we depend on producersl to guide us through a 
maze of complex financial products.2 We trust them to help us 
make the right decisions for ourselves now and for our loved ones 
after we are gone. We rely on them to recommend products that 
are suitable for us and to make us whole when those products fail to 
meet our expectations. A producer's obligation to meet this chal­
lenge varies based on a hodgepodge of sometimes inconsistent, 
overlapping rules and practices. These vary depending on the state, 
type of product, and type of producer. For example, we may re­
ceive one type of suitability advice3 from a producer sitting in his 
office, but different advice from the same person when he is sitting 
in a local bank branch or an office in the next state. The advice 
may also vary if it is doled out by cyber agents on the Internet, 
television "experts," lawyers, accountants, or even "do it yourself" 
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
L.L.M. in Insurance, University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., Benjamin N. Car­
dozo School of Law, B.A., State University of New York at Binghamton, A.I.R.C. & 
F.L.M.I., Life Office Management Association (LOMA), c.L.U. & Ch.F.C., The Amer­
ican College. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author only. 
1. For the purposes of this Article, a "producer" shall refer to any form of agent 
or representative engaged, appointed, or designated by an insurance company (referred 
to herein as a "manufacturer") in connection with the sale and solicitation of "prod­
ucts." Producers may sometimes be categorized as "career agents" (producers who dis­
tribute products primarily for a single manufacturer) and "brokers" (producers 
appointed by many different manufacturers to distribute their products). These terms 
may vary from manufacturer to manufacturer and do not include hybrid relationships 
between producers and manufacturers such as person producing general agents 
(PPGAs). 
2. As used herein, a "product" refers to the life insurance policies or annuity 
contracts issued by a manufacturer. 
3. "Suitability advice" refers to advice given by a producer as to which products 
suit a particular client's needs. 
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financial software programs. The lack of consistency among suita­
bility standards confuses and scares most of us. It also causes trepi­
dation in producers and manufacturers as "suitability" has evolved 
into an after-the-fact way for consumers to hold them responsible 
for the consequences of unfavorable investment experiences. 
Congress may have envisi.oned a universal suitability standard 
when it enacted landmark financial modernization legislation.4 
However, insurance regulators and the insurance industry have thus 
far resisted development of a standard that could be used by all 
producers. The directive to develop.a universal suitability standard, 
along with the emergence of new types of producers who are better 
equipped to compete in the absence of such a standard, provides a 
strong impetus for the financial services industry5 to either rally be­
hind a common benchmark or to have one forced upon them. 
Developing a consensus for a universal standard is no easy 
task. Resistance to it is fueled, in part, by disagreements about how 
or whether such a standard should consider investment outcomes or 
be based on a defined and replicable process. Other considerations 
involve fundamental questions about the standard of care to which 
we should hold producers and whether we should hold customers to 
different standards based on their investment acumen. Ultimately, 
the answers to these questions will have a significant impact on the 
way that products are recommended and the way we view our pro­
ducers and manufacturers. 
Part I of this Article discusses various approaches to suitability 
developed in connection with the sale of traditional and variable 
products.6 Part II briefly explores some of the ways producers have 
been held legally accountable for the outcome of "unsuitable" sales. 
Part III explores different approaches to developing an appropriate 
universal standard. 
4. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
5. For the purposes hereof, the "financial services industry" refers to the business 
sector involved in the sale and solicitation of life insurance, annuities, and the provision 
of associated investment advice. 
6. As used herein, the ~erm "traditional products" refers to life insurance and 
annuities in which policy owners or annuitants, as the case may be, do not share in the 
investment experience associated with their premiums. Examples of traditional policies 
include whole life insurance or fixed annuities. "Variable products" shaH refer to life 
insurance policies or annuities that constitute securities within the meaning of the Se­
curities Act of 1933, as amended, inasmuch as policy owners and annuitants may desig­
nate portions of their premiums to be invested in some form of underlying investment. 
Examples of variable products include variable universal life insurance or variable 
annuities. 
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I. THE VARIOUS ApPROACHES TO SUITABILITY 
The word "suitability" has come to mean different things to 
consumers, producers, and regulators. To some it means the pro­
cess of exploring investment-related risks based on a customer's fi­
nancial sophistication and then recommending" suitable products for 
that consumer. To others, any type of suitability analysis is accept­
able as long as producers are guided by ethical concepts such as fair 
dealing and the provision of clear disclosures. Still others feel that 
each solicitation experience is unique and, therefore, no one stan­
dard should exist. While each of these arguments has its appeal, 
regulators have developed various suitability standards to address 
differences among customers, types of producers, solicitation sites, 
and types of products. 
A. Customer Specific Suitability 
1. 	 The NASD Non-"Sophisticated" Securities Investor 
Suitability Rule 
According to the National Association of Securities Dealers 
("NASD"), "suitability" for the non-"sophisticated" variable prod­
uctcustomer largely involves recommending investments based on 
the customer's particular investor profile and appreciation of 
"risk."7 The first step in this "process is for producers to "know" 
their customers.S This entails conducting a study of their cus­
tomer's financial situation, preferences, and risk tolerance.9 "Fact 
7. Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), NASD Conduct Rule 231O(a), 
NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm. 
8. [d.; see also N.Y.S.E. Rule 405(1),2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 'II 2405, at 3696 
(Aug. 1994). " 
9. See Direct Participation Programs: Suitability, NASD Conduct Rule 
2810(b)(2), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
Distributiori of Securities of Members & Affiliates-Conflicts of Interest: Suitability, 
NASD Conduct Rule 2720(k), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available 
at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
NASAA Omnibus Guidelines, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 'II 2323, at 1388 (Oct. 1983); 
N.Y.S.E. Rule 405(1), supra note 8; OCC Advisory Letter 96-8, 'II D(3), at 10 (Oct. 8, 
1996), available at http://www.occ.ustreas.gov/ftp/advisory/96-8.htm; Options: Suitabil­
ity, NASD Conduct Rule 2860(b)(19), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), 
available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
Policy Statement on Dishonest or Unethical Business Practices, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 'II 
1402, at 901 (Aug. 1997); Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), supra note 7; 
SIB Conduct of Business Rule § 3.01, PIA RULE BOOK 17 (May 1995) (U.K. "know 
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finders" or client data sheets are common methods producers use to 
acquire this information. A "fact finder" is a questionnaire used to 
elicit an array of personal information about a customer.1° This in­
formation may include the following:ll 
your customer" rule); Special Products: Suitability, NASD Conduct Rule 2844, NASD 
Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
Unethical Business Practices of Investment Advisors § 1, Statement of Policy adopted 
by North American Securities Administrators Ass'n, Inc. (Apr. 5, 1985), NASAA Rep. 
(CCH) 'll 2201, at 1301 (1986). See generally Unif. Commercial Code § 1-203,1 U.L.A. 
109 (West Supp. 1999) (good faith performance of all contracts); id. § 2-315 (implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose); Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Re­
sponsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 452 
(1965) (describing the suitability standard as a "first-cousin" to the Uniform Commer­
cial Code implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). For general articles 
discussing the history of securities suitability rules, see Seth C. Anderson & Donald 
Arthur Winslow, Defining Suitability, 81 Ky. L.J. 105 (1992); Richard A. Booth, The 
Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to Measure Risk, 54 Bus. 
LAW. 1599 (1999); Constantine N. Katsoris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORD­
HAM URB. L.J. 483 (1996); Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look at Eco­
nomic Theory and Current SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. L.J. 805 (1985); Lewis D. 
Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 Bus. LAW. 
1557 (1999); F. Harris Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His Customer Under Evolving 
Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 435 (1977); Robert N. 
Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for That Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for 
Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO 
N.V. L. REV. 189 (1998). 
10. NASD Conduct Rule 2310(a) indicates that suitability is based on "the facts, 
if any, disclosed by [the] customer as to his other security holdings and as to his finan­
cial situation and needs." Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), supra note 7; 
see also Customer Account Information, NASD Conduct Rule IM-3110(b), NASD 
Manual & Notices to Members(1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
The NASD Reminds Members of Their Responsibilities Regarding the Sale of Variable 
Life Insurance, NASD Notice to Members 00-44, June 16, 2000, 2000 WL 1375112 (Na­
tionallFederal) [hereinafterNTM 00-44]; Standards Applicable to Communications 
with the Public, NASD Conduct Rule 2210(d)(2)(B)(ii), NASD Manual & Notices to 
Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, NASD Conduct Rule IM-231O-3, 
NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dIl?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm. 
11. See Recommendations to Customers. (Suitability), NASD Conduct Rule 
2310(b), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dIl?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
see also Fair Dealing with Customers, NASD Conduct Rule IM-2310-2(b)(5), NASD 
Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.com!wbsINETbos.dIl?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
The NASD Reminds Members of Their Responsibility Regarding the Sale of Variable 
Annuities; Notice to Members 99-35 (May 1999), 1999 WL 33176256 (NationallFederal) 
[hereinafter NTM 99-35]; NTM 00-44, supra note 10; Online Suitability: Suitability 
Rule and Online Communications, NASD Notice to Members 01-23, at 5 n.7 (Apr. 
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• Personal information (occupation, marital status, 	age,12 number 
of dependents, investment objectives, risk tolerance,B tax status, 
investment experience, liquid net worth, other investments and 
savings, and annual income14); 
• Liquid and illiquid assets (income, cash and equivalents, real and 
personal property, intangibles, etc.); 
• Fixed and variable liabilities (personal and business indebted­
ness, financial responsibilities, etc.); 
• Investments inventory (stocks, bonds, mutual funds, annuities, 
etc.); and, 
2001), available at http://members.nasdr.comlpdf-textl0123ntm.txt [hereinafter NTM 
01-23]; Standards Applicable to Communications with the Public, supra note 10. See 
generally In re Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 133, 138 (1960) (stating that a broker-dealer must 
attempt to become familiar with the customer "so as to be in a position to judge the 
suitability of the recommendation"). 
12. Customer age is a significant factor, in addition to investment sophistication, 
in assessing suitability; particularly where speculative investments or churning is in­
volved. See NTM 00-44, supra note 10 (overage monitoring); In re Lewis, 50 S.E.C. 
747,749 & n.11 (1991) (finding that frequent margin and options trading involving an 82 
year-old wealthy widow violates suitability requirements as well as "'the fundamental 
responsibility for fair dealing' implicit in the relationship between a broker and his or 
her customers") (citing Fair Dealing with Customers, supra note 11). See generally 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-23-303 (1999), (authorizing the insurance commissioner to 
determine that certain types of disability insurance, life insurance, or annuity products 
are "inherently unsuitable" for persons of certain ages and any subsequent sale to such 
persons must be accompanied by a signed disclosure statement); Estate of Wheaton v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 463 N.Y.S.2d 727, 728 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (fmding that an 80 
year-old in poor health "might very well have reasonably" interpreted a producer's 
statement as to suitability of an immediate annuity to be factual and not an expression 
of opinion); COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NAT'L BANK EXAM'RS, § 413.1, O.c.c. 
Bull. 94-13 (1994) (temp. insert): 
One example of a critical suitability determination involves sales to elderly 
bank customers. Many of these customers rely upon investments or savings 
for retirement income and may consequently· demand high yields. They may 
not, however, have the ability to absorb or recover losses. A nondeposit in­
vestment person should also be aware that it is especially important to make a 
careful suitability recommendation when dealing with a surviving spouse who 
is not experienced in investment matters. 
Id.; see also id. § 413.4 (listing the suitability questions used for compliance 
monitoring). 
13. Risk tolerance refers to a customer's express Willingness to assume different 
levels of investment risk in exchange for possible returns. For instance, someone who 
would prefer not to lose money investing generally would be considered to have a low 
risk tolerance. Alternatively, someone who would be willing to take a chance of losing 
an investment for the opportunity to make a lot more money would be considered to 
have a high-risk tolerance. 
14. NTM 99-35, supra note 11; see also Exchange Act Release No. 8,135, 
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <JI 77,459, at 82,890 (Aug. 9, 1967); 
N.Y.S.E. Rule 721(b), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) <JI 2721.10, at 4558 (Dec. 1995) (requir­
ing members to exercise due diligence in ascertaining facts about their customers). 
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• Documentation inventory (wills, trusts, etc.). 
The next step in this form of suitability analysis is to assess 
potential investment strategies to find products that are consistent 
with the customer's general risk tolerance and investment hori­
zon.1S To develop an understanding of a customer's risk tolerance, 
producers may evaluate current holdings. Such an examination will 
enable the producer to probe a customer's awareness of the differ­
ent types of investment risks (such as market, inflation, liquidity, 
interest rate, currency, and lost opportunity risks). Producers may 
also try to gauge the customer's sophistication about economic 
trends affecting the relevant securities markets under consideration. 
Part of this process may also entail developing a sense of whether 
the customer has the mental and fiscal constitution to withstand fi­
nanciallosses or market fluctuations, for even the best planned in­
vestment strategy will be of no value to a customer who is incapable 
of stomaching market downturns.16 Curiously, despite these com­
mon concerns and techniques, there is no quantum of information, 
or data gathering device, that all producers use to assess consumer 
risk tolerances reliably and consistently. 
15. The term "investment horizon" is used to refer to the relative point in time 
when the customer is likely to want to recoup his investment. For example, a person 
saving for a newborn's college education would have an approximately sixteen-year 
investment horizon. 
16. See MICHAEL J. ROSZKOWSKI, RISK-ToLERANCE IN FINANCIAL DECISIONS, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL PLANNING 57-99 (2d ed. 1993). This propensity to un­
derestimate risk could be a possible basis for misrepresentations. See generally CON­
SUMEN. RESEARCH UNIT, LIMRA INT'L, INC., DIRECf RESPONSE: BUYING LIFE 
INSURANCE THROUGH BANKS AND S&Ls 35 (Judith R. Kulak ed. 1999) [hereinafter 
DIRECf RESPONSE] (noting that a significant number of bank customers acknowledge 
that they did not really understand what policy they had purchased); Adopted SIB Rule 
S3.03(2), PIA RULE BOOK, (June 1998) (stating that U.K. customers must understand 
the risk inherent in recommended investments); Booth, supra note 9, at 1605 (advocat­
ing that producers who cause customers to assume unnecessary risk should be liable 
under well-established principles of fiduciary duty); Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, 
Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 
53 Bus. LAW. 429 (1998) (examining the extent to which management owes a fiduciary 
duty to stockholders and the stockholders' right to sue for breach); Howell E. Jackson, 
Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 
WASH. u. L.Q. 319, 345, 349, 356-67 (1999) (explaining that while informed consent 
may relieve a regulated party from some disclosure-oriented duties, disclosure strate­
gies are not entirely effective in helping public investors to process information about 
risk and the multi-faceted nature of insurance); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, As­
sumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 
851,858-72 (1992) (discussing the rationality of investor behavior); Lynn A. Stout, Are 
Stock Markets Costly Casinos?, 81 VA. L. REv. 611 (1995) (suggesting a heterogeneous 
expectations model for predicting investor expectations ex ante and avoiding ex post 
disappointment). 
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Recommendation of a particular product also varies depending 
on the consumer's anticipated investment horizon and financial re­
sources. For instance, consumers may be attracted to different 
products depending on how long they expect to live. Similarly, a 
consumer's current financial resources may dictate whether she 
elects to purchase more or less insurance. Taken together, a pro­
ducer might recommend that a young person, who expects to live a 
long life and has little disposable income at the time of solicitation, 
buy only as much insurance as is necessary for her burial. On the 
other hand, a producer might recommend that a 40-year-old per­
son, who has a great deal of disposable income at the time of solici­
tation, buy enough insurance to sustain her family in the lifestyle to 
which they have become accustomed, pay for her children's college 
education, and perhaps leave some remaining proceeds for her fa­
vorite charity. 
The suitability analysis process culminates with a "recommen­
dation." A recommendation should be supported by the producer's 
development of a reasonable basis to believe that it is suitable for 
that specific customer17 "or at least some customers."18 The exact 
form of communications that constitute a recommendation varies 
depending upon the facts and circumstances.19 The determination 
of how or whether a "recommendation" was made is critical be­
cause producers who act as mere order-takers for their customers' 
unsolicited orders are exempt from the obligation to perform a suit­
ability analysis.20 
17. NTM 01-23, supra note 11, at n.3 (discussing relevancy to "more traditional 
communications, such as discussions in person, over the telephone, or through postal 
mail"). 
18. Id. at n.4. While suitability should preferably be based on the instant con­
sumer's preference and needs, the NASD acknowledges that a producer could defend 
the suitability of a recommendation if the recommendation would be suitable for other 
consumers with a similar risk profile. Id. 
19. Id. at 3. 
20. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-30,608, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,017 (Apr. 28, 1992) 
(stating that a broker-dealer has not made a recommendation when it acts solely as an 
order taker); NTM 01-23, supra note 11, at n.7; Clarification of Notice to Members 96­
60, Mar. 1997, 1997 WL 1909772 (NationaJ/Federal) (stating that events or circum­
stances constituting a recommendation "depend on an analysis of all the relevant facts 
and circumstances"); see also Exchange Act Release No. 8,135 [1966-1967 Transfer 
Binder], supra note 14, at 82,890 (commenting that mass mailings of research report to 
all customers should not constitute a recommendation). But see Exchange Act Rule 
15g-9m, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9(b) (1999) (penny stock suitability rules); Members Re­
minded to Use Best Practices When Dealing in Speculative Securities, NASD Notice to 
Members 96-32, May 9, 1996, 1996 WL 1771312 (NationaJ/Federal) [hereinafter NTM 
96-32] (stating that suitability requirements do not vary as to whether the sale was solic­
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2. The Sophisticated Securities Customer 
"Sophisticated" and institutional securities investors are sub­
ject to different suitability standards than the average investor de­
scribed above.21 Consistent with other securities laws, NASD 
Conduct Rules arguably establish lower suitability obligations for 
affluent or astute securities investors.22 Regardless of these thresh­
ited or not solicited when involving low-price, speculative securities). With few excep­
tions, such as term life insurance, it could be argued that most life products are "sold" 
rather than "bought," thereby eliminating a producer's opportunity to avoid suitability 
obligations. See DIRECf RESPONSE, supra note 16, at 29; see also Sales Practice Re­
quirements for Certain Low- Priced Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 27,160 [1989 
Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'll 84,440, at 80,416 (Aug. 22, 1989) (penny 
stocks). 
21. Some types of investors included in this group are financial institutions, trusts 
with total assets in excess of $5 million, and affluent investors. Securities Act of 1933, 
17 CF.R. § 230.501(a) (1992) (defining "accredited investors" to include (a) person 
whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time of 
purchase exceeds $1 million or (b) person who had an individual income in excess of 
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse 
in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a "reasonable expectation" of 
reaching the same income level in the current year); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
17 CF.R. § 275.205(a) (1992) (permitting performance based advisory contracts with 
"qualified clients"); 17 CF.R. § 275.205-3(d)(I) (defining "qualified clients" to include, 
among other things, (i) persons who have at least $750,000 under management with the 
investment adviser; or (ii) a person or company that has a net worth, individually or 
with a spouse, of more than $1.5 million at the time of contract); Investment Company 
Act of 1940,15 U.S.CA. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (West 1997) (exempting non-pUblicly traded 
entities comprised of "qualified purchasers" from the definition of an investment com­
pany). "Qualified purchasers" generally include (i) people or companies who own not 
less than $5 million in investments; (ii) trusts whose trustees consist of qualified pur­
chasers; and (iii) any person, acting for his own behalf or other qualified purchasers, 
who in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not less than $25 million 
in investments. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.CA. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) 
(West 1997). 
22: See Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, supra note 10 (noting 
that while the suitability guidelines applicable to institutional customers adopted in 
1996 are "difficult to determine in advance," they continue to be "customer-specific"); 
see also Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1989) (listing the plaintiff's 
sophistication and expertise in financial and securities matters as a factor in assessing 
the reasonableness of a plaintiffs reliance); Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978), affd, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981) 
(stating that the manner in which a broker carries out his duties depends on the cus­
tomer's intelligence and personality); cf Myers v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 
1991) (stating that criteria other than wealth, such as age, education, professional status, 
investment experience, and business background, may be relevant in assessing sophisti­
cation); Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F. Supp. 848, 854 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(stating that business sophistication of customer is irrelevant in the context of a statute 
of limitations challenge). But see Hanly v. SEC., 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (hold­
ing that a salesperson's due diligence obligations relative to recommended securities are 
not affected by customer sophistication); NASD Issues Rule Proposal on Members' 
Suitability Obligations, 27 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 594 (Apr. 21, 1995) 
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olds, a producer, who is also a registered representative?3 continues 
to be expected to meet "high standards of competence, profession­
alism, and good faith."24 The NASD has identified two important 
considerations in determining the suitability of a recommendation 
to a sophisticated customer.25 The first ·factor is the customer's abil­
ity to independently evaluate investment risk.26 NASD Conduct 
Rule IM-231O-3 provides the following guidance in assessing inde­
pendent risk assessment: 
A member must determine, based on the information availa­
ble to it, the customer's capability to evaluate investment risk. In 
some cases, the member may conclude that the customer is not 
capable of making independent investment decisions in general. 
In other cases, the institutional customer may have general capa­
bility, but may not be able to understand a particular type of in­
strument or its risk .... If a customer is either generally not 
capable of evaluating investment risk or lacks sufficient capabil­
ity to evaluate the particular product, the scope of a member's 
customer-specific obligations under the suitability rule would not 
be diminished by the fact that the member was dealing with an 
institutional customer. On the other hand, the fact that a cus­
tomer initially needed help understanding a potential investment 
need not necessarily imply that the customer did not ultimately 
develop an understanding and make an independent investment 
(offering guidance to members on how to determine when their obligations to institu­
tional investors have been met, but cautioning that the proposed rule did not provide a 
"safe harbor"). See generally Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The 
Suitability Doctrine Is Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 
527, 546-65 (1998) (discussing the impact of suitability standards on institutional inves­
tors in the aftermath of derivatives investments gone awry); Rapp, supra note 9, at 232­
35 (examining cases involving sophisticated customers). 
23. In securities sales, the term "registered representative" refers to any producer 
who is associated with a broker-dealer that is a member of the NASD. 
24. Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, supra note 10; see also Fair 
Dealing with Customers, supra note 11. Even though the registered representative may 
rely on customer statements in connection with its suitability analysis, Recommenda­
tions to Customers (Suitability), supra note 7, the potential repercussions for an incor­
rect conclusion may justify independent verification. The SEC has consistently looked 
to whether customers, especially wealthy older customers who were new to investing, 
fully understood and accepted investment risks. See, e.g., In re Dambro, 51 S.E.C. 513, 
517 (1993) (stating that the appropriateness of a transaction is based on the particular 
investor and not whether the individual can afford to lose the money invested); In re 
Erdos, 47 S.E.C. 985, 989 (1983) (finding that excessive trading in the account of an 
elderly widow of limited financial means violated suitability standards); In re Philips & 
Co., 37 S.E.C. 66, 70 (1956) (stating that recommendations must be consistent with a 
customer's financial situation and needs). 
25. Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, supra note 10. 
26. Id. 
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decision.27 
The second "most important" factor is the customer's ability to 
exercise independent judgment in evaluating the representative's 
recommendations.28 The following statement summarizes the ap­
plication of these prerequisites: 
A member may conclude that a customer is exercising inde­
pendent judgment if the customer's investment decision will be 
based on its own independent assessment of the opportunities 
and risks presented by a potential investment, market factors and 
other investment considerations. Where the broker-dealer has 
reasonable grounds for concluding that the institutional customer 
is making independent investment decisions and is capable of in­
dependently evaluating investment risk, then a member's obliga­
tion to determine that a recommendation is suitable for a 
particular customer is fulfilled. Where a customer has delegated 
decision-making authority to an agent, such as an investment ad­
visor or a bank trust department, this interpretation shall be ap­
plied to the agent.29 
The NASD also lists various "resources" and considerations30 
for whether a customer could be making independent investment 
decisions. Clearly, these factors indicate a lesser sense of paternal­
ism toward these invest()rs as compared to the average customer. 
B. Product Specific Suitability Standards 
The following discussion illustrates that in addition to cus­
tomer-specific suitability standards, the type of suitability analysis 
provided could vary based on the type of product recommended. 
Suitability standards for traditional products31 differ from those ap~ 
plied to variable products.32 One explanation for this difference 
could be that most insurance regulators have yet to embrace any 
suitability standard while self-regulatory organizations, such as the 
NASD, have had enduring standards that have been publicly en­
forced.33 Another reason could be that the paternalistic approach 
27. Id. (According to NASD parlance, the word "member" refers to any broker-
dealer that maintains membership with the NASD.). 
28. Suitability Obligations to Institutional Customers, supra note 10. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. See supra note 6 for a definition of traditional products. 
32. See supra note 6 for a definition of variable products. 
33. See In re Holland, 52 S.E.C. 562 (1995); In re Keel, 51 S.E.C. 282, 283 & 286 
(1993) (determining that a customer's failure to complain that transactions were un au­
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taken by state insurance regulations contrasts with the disclosure 
orientation of securities laws.34 The differences between ap­
proaches by insurance regulators, on one hand, and securities and 
banking regulators, on the other, may soon become more blurred as 
a result of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley" Act35 andnumerous attempts 
by entities such as the NASD and Securities and Exchange Com­
mission ("SEC") to extrapolate their standards onto insurance re­
lated· products.36 
thorized does not relieve a broker of the obligation to meet suitability standards); In re 
Wickswat, 50 S.E.C. 785, 787 (1991) (stating that registered representatives must make 
recommendations consistent with the customer's objectives and needs regardless of 
whether the customer acquiesces in the particular strategy); In re F.J. Kaufman & Co., 
50 S.E.C. 164 (1989) (stating that registered representatives have a duty to recommend 
and sell products that were consistent with the customer's specific investment needs and 
objectives); NAT'L ASs'N OF SECS. DEAiERS, INC., NASD SANCTION GUIDELINES 91-92 
(2001), available at http://www.nasdr.com/31oo.asp (recommending various penalties for 
egregious violations of sales practices, including suspension or bar of the registered rep­
resentative or broker, fines of up to $100,000, rescission, and restitution); Carl B. Wil­
kerson, A New Regulatory Paradigm: Variable Product Distribution And Compliance, 
Address to the 1998 ACLI Compliance Section Annual Meeting (July 15, 1998) (moni­
toring of suitability of initial sales and sub-account investments has become an indica­
tion of good internal controls and sales practices) (on file with author). 
34. It may be argued that the NASD's approach to suitability allows a consumer 
to make an investment decision once the producer provides all relevant information. 
On the other hand, insurance regulators tend to over-protect consumers by considering 
factors such as the consumer's wherewithal to appreciate the nature of the disclosures 
provided. See supra Part I for a discussion of different approaches to determining 
suitability. 
35. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). 
36. See Rules Relating to Over-the-Counter Markets, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 
(1999) (involving suitability of equity funding programs in which mutual fund shares are 
pledged as collateral for loans used to fund insurance premiums); Application of NASD 
Conduct Rules to Group Variable Contracts and Other Exempted Securities, NASD 
Notice to Members No. 97-27, May 1997, 1997 WL 1909794 (NationallFederal); NASD 
Regulation Reminds Members and Associated Persons .That Sales of Variable. Con­
tracts Are Subject to NASD Suitability Requirements, NASD Notice to Members No. 
96-86, Dec. 1996, 1996 WL 1771346 (NationallFederal) [hereinafter NTM 96-86]; NASD 
Files with the SEC Proposed Rule Governing Members Operating on Bank Premises, 
NASD Notice to Members No. 96-3, Jan. 1996, 1996 WL 1771293 (NationallFederal). 
Variable insurance products, it is said, are "kitchen table" products, be­
cause they're sold to aging baby boomers, perhaps along with other insurance 
products like life, home or auto insurance, in conversations at the consumer's 
kitchen table. These consumers may be first time annuity buyers who may not 
have the financial background or experience to readily understand the risks of 
investing. Many have never seen a down market. Couple this fact with the 
complexity of the variable annuity product itself, and the fact that many con­
sumers may not realize the variable annuity is an investment that can decrease 
in value, and you have the potential for problems. 
Lori A. Richards, Good Compliance: A Small Price to Pay for the Enormous Growth in 
Variable Annuities, Address to the National Association for Variable Annuities (June 
30, 1997) (transcript on file with author); see also Dist. Bus. Conduct Comm. v. Cruz, 
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1. Traditional Products 
Very few states have a suitability standard applicable to tradi­
tional products. For those states that do have a standard, the words 
used to regulate this process range from "suitable,"37 "not unsuita­
ble,"38 to "inherently unsuitable."39 More states are not likely to 
adopt a suitability standard that addresses both traditional and vari-
No. CSA930048, 1997 WL 33101218, at *2 (Nat'l Bus. Conduct Comm. Oct. 31, 1997) 
(applying NASD rules to a flexible premium variable life insurance product). For a 
discussion of various regulatory excursions, see Jackson, supra note 16, at 379-87. 
37. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60k.14 subd. 4 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 72A.20 subd. 34 (West Supp. 2002); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 45-02-02­
14(2)(1998); see also LIFE INS. DISCLOSURE MODEL REG. §2(A), III NAIC Model Reg. 
Servo 580-1 (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs, Inc.) (Oct. 2000). But see KAN. ADMIN. REGS. 
§ 40-2-14(c)(5). The sporadic adoption of a traditional insurance suitability standard 
contrasts with the vast adoption of such standards for variable life insurance and states 
that have adopted securities suitability requirements for prohibited unethical and dis­
honest practices in their blue sky laws. See VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG., at 270-32 
to -33. Several states have adopted a securities suitability requirement. See ALA. AD­
MIN. CODE § 830-X-3.21(1)(a), 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 7436B, at 3416 (Sept. 1999); 
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §§ 36b-31-15a(a)(2) & 15c(a)(2) (1998) (advisors); FLA. AD· 
MIN. CODE ANN. r. 3E-600.013(I)(d), lA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 17,463A, at 13,431 
(Apr. 2001); IDA. BLUE SKY REG. r. 188, lA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 21,411H, at 
17,411 (Nov. 2001) (unsuitable recommendations); IND. ADMIN. CODE § 1-16-22(a)(I), 
2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 24,613M, at 19,475-17 (July 1999); IOWA CODE § 502.404,2 
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 25,144, at 20,130 (June 2001); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 10:040(2)(5),2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 27,404, at 22,403-3 (Nov. 2000); MD. BLUE 
SKY REG. R. .03(B)(I), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 30,453, at 25,429 (Mar. 2002); 
MONT. ADMIN. R. 6.1O.126(c), 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 36,467, at 31,515 (Dec. 
2001); NEB. DEP'T BANKING & FIN., tit. 48 r. 002.15, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 
37,412, at 32,526 (Dec. 2001) (inappropriate investments); NEV. ADMIN. CODE. ch. 90 
§ 328(h), 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 36,436B, at 33,505 (Mar. 1998) (over-the­
'counter securities); N.M. ADMIN. CODE. tit.12, § 11.4.5, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 
41,538, at 36,415 (May 2001); 18 N.C. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 18 r. 6.1414(b)(3), 2A Blue Sky 
L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 43,458, at 38,524 (Dec. 2000); N.D. SEC. COMM'R REG. § 73-02-09­
02(3),3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 44,462, at 39,506 (May 2001); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 
1301:6-3-19(A)(5), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 45,540, at 40,529-13 (Dec. 1999); OKLA. 
BLUE SKY REG. § 660:1O-5-42(b)(2), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 46,472, at 41,527 
(Aug. 1998); TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 117.3,3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 55,603, at 49,568­
70 (Jan. 1999) (real estate programs); VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-20-280(A)(3), 3A Blue Sky 
L. Rep. (CCH) en 60,426, at 53,517 (July 2001); WASH. ADMIN. CODE. § 460-22B-090(7), 
3A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) en 61,618H, at 54,526-27 (Apr. 2000); WIS. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 5.06(4), 3A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 64,586, at 56,547 (Jan. 2002); WYo. BLUE SKY 
REG. ch. 4, § 6(c), 3A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 66,425A, at 57,506 (Aug. 1997). 
38. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 191-15.8(4) (1998); VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG. 
§ 3(C), at 270-74. 
39. See, e.g., UT. CODE ANN. § 31A-23-303 (2000) (stating that inherently unsuit­
able sales are voidable); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724(16) (1997) (stating that an unfair 
or deceptive practice includes "soliciting, selling or issuing an insurance policy when the 
person soliciting, selling, or issuing the policy has reason to know or should have reason 
to know that it is unsuitable for the person purchasing it"). 
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able products as the insurance industry and its regulators have not 
been eager to embrace a securities oriented suitability standard.40 
Beyond concerns of second-guessing by customers, competitors and 
the plaintiffs' bar,41 it has been argued that the fundamental nature 
of traditional products defies direct comparison with securities suit­
ability standards.42 In fact, the New York Insurance Department 
40. N.Y. INS. DEP'T, REpORT ON SUITABILITY 2 (1998). 

[I]t should be recognized that the underlying premises of a suitability require­

ment are that (1) life insurance and annuity products have become increas­

ingly complex financial instruments, and (2) many consumers are not 

sufficiently informed to make wise purchase decisions, in that (a) they are not 

aware of all the types of insurance and other products available in the market; 

(b) they cannot judge the appropriateness or inappropriateness of certain 

products, and ( c) they do not know the true cost of such products. 

[d. 
A NAIC Suitability Working Group was created in 1998 to produce a white paper 
as to the advisability of drafting a model law or regulation giving insurers responsibility 
to determine suitability of sales of life insurance and annuities as a result of a charge 
assigned to the Life Insurance and Annuities (A) Committee. NAT'L ASs'N OF INS. 
COMM'RS, SUITABILITY OF SALES OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES 1 (2000), availa­
ble at http://www.naic.org [hereinafter NAIC WHITE PAPER]. The charge was precipi­
tated, in large part, by concerns expressed by the members of two working groups, the 
Replacement Issues Working Group and the Annuities Working Group. [d. See http:// 
www.naic.org/1committee/suitability/suitwg.htm (overviewing various comments to 
these drafts). On March 18, 2002, .the Suitability Working Group of the A Committee 
released a new model regulation addressing the suitability of sales of fixed life insur­
ance and annuities. At the NAIC Summer National Meeting held on June 11, 2002, the 
A Committee considered but did not adopt the model. See http://www.naic.org/ 
1papers/models/models.html. 
41. See Letter from Benjamin Y. Brewster, Jr., Director, Government Affairs, 
New York State Association of Life Underwriters, Inc., to Neil D. Levin, Superinten­
dent State of New York Insurance Department (Nov. 24, 1998) (on file with author); 
Letter from Donald J. Walters, Senior Counsel, American Council of Life Insurance, to 
Carolyn J. Johnson, National Association of Insurance Commissioners 8 (Sept. 22, 
1999) (on file with author) (concluding that subjectivity of a suitability standard applied 
to traditional product sales would likely exacerbate existing class action litigation). 
42. See N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, at 10 ("The determination as to suitability 
for life insurance and annuity products is more subjective than in the securities industry 
because competent professionals may legitimately disagree as to which products best 
suit the consumer's needs."); Letter from Life Insurance Council of New York Inc., to 
N.Y. Insurance Department (Sept. 28, 1998) affixed to N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, 
at attachment 3. 
Even when the inquiry is expressed as "not unsuitable", a double negative that 
roughly equates to "not bad for you," the life insurance industry has misgiv­
ings about any standard suggesting mandatory suitability, because even within 
the industry there is a great variety of viewpoint about what products or sell­
ing methods are best for the consumer. The industry is concerned that every 
sale could be subject to an infinity of second guessing and litigation, not be­
cause of obvious movements of the market as in securities, but due to shifting 
sentiment or the conflicting views that could be expressed about a given in­
surer or agent or given insurance product. In the, securities field, nobody ever 
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outright rejected applying the suitability paradigm employed by the 
securities industry to the sale of any traditional products.43 As a 
result, approaches to suitability continue to vary greatly between 
the securities and life insurance industries. 
Nonetheless, many producers of traditional products have uti­
lized certain aspects of variable product suitability standards, such 
as the benefits of completing a fact finder44 and conducting an in­
surance inventory (life, health, disability, property, and other insur­
ance policies, etc.) in order to compare products.45 
One apparent difference between variable and traditional 
product suitability standards is the focus on a customer's "needs." 
This difference could be attributed to the common belief that a 
traditional product may be recommended only if it satisfied some 
complains about the suitability of a recommendation to buy low and sell high. 
In life insurance and annuity sales, suitability will be ever more difficult to 
measure because of the subjective and changing circumstances of a buyer, in­
sured, or beneficiary. 
Id. See generally VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG., II NAIC Model Reg. Servo 270-32 
to -33 (Nat' I Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (Jan. 1996). 
43. N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, at 10; see'also Letter from Donald J. Walters, 
Senior Counsel, American Council of Life Insurance, to Carolyn Johnson, National As­
sociation of Insurance Commissioners, supra note 41 (stating that suitability standards 
are inapplicable to traditional (non-variable) life insurance and annuity products based 
on the absence of principal fluctuations and the presumed absence of inherent invest­
ment objectives); NAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 40. The proposition that existing 
laws adequately address market conduct relative to suitability disregards the reality that 
producers may contemporaneously solicit variable and/or traditional products. Hence, 
it is ludicrous to assume that the producer would be in a position to realistically safe­
guard customer best interests by going through somersaults to meet NASD suitability 
demands for variable sales and then, on the other hand, stand mute as the customer 
potentially catapults from a cliff of poor decision-making in connection with a fixed­
dollar purchase. This hyper-reaction to universal regulation has also led many produc­
ers to either ignore, or to take less seriously, the traditional insurance suitability re­
quirements, especially as their insurance licenses are not necessarily jeopardized by 
such blissful ignorance. 
44. See VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG. § 3(C) cmts. at 270-32. This section 
was derived, in part, from the NAIC Model Regulation on Deceptive Practices Section 
5(g). Id. § 3(C) cmts. at 270-31; see also id. § 8(C), at 270-18; Michael W. Kessler, The 
Suitability Provision of the NAIC Model Variable Life Insurance Regulation, II NAT'L 
ASS'N INS. COMM'RS 544 (1974); INS. MARKETPLACE STANDARDS ASS'N ASSESSMENT 
HANDBOOK 42 (David A. Vaprin ed. 1997) (implementing a principle of ethical con­
duct) [hereinafter IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK]; IOWA. ADMIN. CODE § 191-15.8(4) 
(1999) (stating that suitability analysis for group life insurance or annuities must con­
sider the interests of the intended group policy owner). 
45. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 60K.14 subd. 4 (West Supp. 2002) (requiring produc­
ers to compare the values, benefits, and costs of the customer's existing insurance pro­
gram with the values, benefits, and costs of the recommended policy or policies); N.D. 
ADMIN. CODE § 45-02-02-14(2)(c) (1999). 
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articulated customer "need."46 A manufacturer's underwriting pro­
cess also depends on the expression of a definitive purpose for a 
product purchase in order to avoid anti-selection or speculation.47 
A needs analysis can be a linear analysis of a customer's finan­
cial situation and aspirations.48 The "needs" being addressed in life 
insurance solicitations are usually those of the proposed benefi­
ciaries as viewed through the eyes of the applicant-customer. This 
type of SUbjectivity, however, leaves great room for miscalculations 
and exposure flowing from misjudgments based on second-hand as­
sessments. For instance, a spouse may disagree strongly with the 
spouse purchasing the product about how much money is needed 
46. For instance, Principle 1 of the Insurance Marketplace Standards Association 
(IMSA) Principles of Ethical Market Conduct, adopted by many life insurance compa­
nies, requires that insurers and their producers render services to customers that, in the 
same circumstances, they would apply to or demand for themselves. 1MSA ASSESS­
MENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 42. Code A of this Principle demands that produc­
ers "make reasonable efforts to determine the insurable needs or financial objectives 
of ... customers based upon relevant information obtained from the customer and 
enter into transactions which assist the customer in meeting his or her insurable needs 
or financial objectives." Id.; see also VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG. § 3( C), at 270­
74; Robert M. Crowe, Meeting Client Needs Through Financial Planning, in FUNDA­
MENTALS OF FINANCIAL PLANNING 1-28 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing financial planning 
considerations involving all aspects of a customer's financial position); Robbin Derry, 
The Ethical Environment of Financial Planning, in FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL 
PLANNING 399, 406-08 (citing The American College's Professional Pledge which sup­
ports "customer focused" planning or selling); CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AM. SOc'Y OF 
CLU & CHFC, Guide 1.1, cmts. A & C, Guide 1.4, reprinted in FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FINANCIAL PLANNING 408-09 (supporting initial and ongoing needs analysis) (the or­
ganization is now the Society of Fmancial Services Professionals); Thomas J. Wolff, 
How Much Life Insurance Is Enough?, in MCGILL'S LIFE INSURANCE 873-84 (1994). 
47. JANE L. BROWN, INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION 128, 131-32 (1997); see also 
Letter from Life Insurance Council of New York, to N.Y. Insurance Department (Sept. 
28, 1998) affixed to N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, at attachment 3 (explaining that 
needs analysis in life insurance uniquely involves insurable interest considerations); 
Kessler, supra note 44, at 543. 
48. See KENNETH HUGGINS, ET AL., INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN INSURANCE 
COMPANIES 320-21 (1995); see also Kessler, supra note 44, at 542. 
In order to be "suitable," any product must reasonably purport to meet the 
need for which it is purchased as perceived by the purchaser. However, as a 
product or service becomes more complex, and the purchaser is encouraged 
and/or compelled as a result of such complexity to rely on the representations 
of a professional and experienced vendor as to how well the product meets the 
purchaser'S needs, it becomes clear that the seller's conception of these needs 
and the ability of his product to meet them becomes an equally significant 
factor in ascertaining "suitability." 
Id. A registered representative's perception of a customer's financial objectives is a 
poor defense to claims of unsuitability where churning is alleged or when unqualified 
customers trade speculative securities. See, e.g., In re Keel, 51 S.E.C. 282, 287 (1993) 
(finding that representative bears a fiduciary duty to customers about the risks of op­
tions trading); In re Lewis, 50 S.E.C. 747, 748-49 (1991). 
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for his or her future sustenance. The highly personal nature of the 
decisions that a customer must make in deciding among various 
types and amounts of life insurance has 'led to speculation that the 
producer alone bears the ultimate responsibility for inquiring 
whether the customer "loves their mother or spouse more. "49 
2. Needs Hierarchy 
Financial needs could be viewed in terms of a Maslow50 type 
hierarchy of needs. Under this conceptual approach, the most im­
portant and largest life needs such as food and shelter, medical, 
property and casualty insuranc~, and emergency funds would con­
stitute primary needs that must be secured before resources could 
begin to be allocated to life and di~ability insurance or perhaps edu­
cation, retirement and estate planning. The last "needs" to be satis­
fied from remaining disposable resources could then be devoted to 
speculative investments. 
Under a needs-hierarchy approach, customers must identify 
the relative level of resources that they are willing to commit to 
each tier of "needs." Producers using this conceptual approach 
might ask their customers to allocate greater resources to primary 
tiers or, perhaps, to skew resources to a higher tier even though a 
lower tier may be insufficiently funded. For instance, a customer 
could buy a life insurance policy even though he or she has little or 
no emergency funds. 
49. Facsimile from Susan N. Skaling, Associate General Counsel, Life Insurance 
Council of New York, to Section 4228 Coordinating Committee (Aug. 25, 1998) (on file 
with author). 
50. The behaviorist Abraham Maslow developed a theory of human motivation 
that used a pyramid to designate the hierarchy between physiological needs, safety, love 
and acceptance, esteem and self-fulfillment. A. a Maslow, A Theory of Human Moti­
vation, 50 PSYCHOL. REv. 370-96 (July 1943), cited in ROBERT KREITNER, MANAGE· 
MENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 399-402 (1995); see also DEARBORN FIN. INST., INC., 
SERIES 7, GENERAL SECURITIES REPRESENTATIVE LICENSE EXAM MANUAL 469 fig. 
15.1 (10th ed. 1998). The investment pyramid is based on safety oriented instruments 
such as cash, money-market funds, certificates of deposit, U.S. Treasury securities, 
bank-grade corporate and municipal bonds, some real estate blue chip stocks, blue chip 
stock, and bond mutual funds. The next, smaller tier is dedicated to growth instruments 
such as growth and small-capitalization stocks, stock options, non-pank-grade bonds, 
growth-oriented limited partnerships, growth stock mutual funds, commodities funds 
and variable annuities. The top tier of investments is speculative in nature and includes 
speculative stocks and stock options, low-rated debt securities, precious metals, com­
modities and futures, speculative limited partnerships, and speculative mutual funds. 
Id. 
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3. Expense Analysis 
A person's need for insurance could also be broadly conceptu­
alized in terms of the following formula: 
I = (F + E + A + R) - II 
where, I = insurance needed 
F = funds to be established, such as education and emergency funds 
E = expenses payable, such as estate settlement, mortgage redemp­
tion, estate taxes, medical bills and funeral costs 
A = ancillary expenses, such as charitable contributions 
R = family revenue needed to replace the ordinary and anticipated 
living expenses formerly paid by the deceased person 
II = face amount of in-force insurance 
As with any linear model, this analysis may be criticized as be­
ing very static and unrealistic if any assumption conflicts with actual 
results. In other words, the computation does not consider infla­
tion, technological advances, or lifestyle adjustinents, among other 
unforeseeable circumstances. 
4. Capital Needs Analysis 
Capital needs analysis is another variation of expense analysis. 
Simply stated, this process may be conceptually described by the 
following formula: 
I = (N + PVFFO) - (A + M) 
where, I = insurance needed 
N = all identified capital needs (e.g., debt elimination, education 
and/or retirement funding, income sources, etc.) 
PVFFO = present value of future financial obligations based on pre­
sumed interest, inflation, and tax factors 
A = available assets 
M = available income 
In addition to being considered static, this method assumes 
that all available assets and income will be depleted to satisfy iden­
tified needs. Assumptions regarding inflation and future tax struc­
tures create the potential for gross deviations from actual future 
needs. The downward spiral of depleting resources also affects pos­
sible assumptions regarding future investment income as well as re­
sulting in a possibly barren estate for contingent beneficiaries. 
5. Human Life Value Method 
One academic expression of the need for life insurance is to 
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replace the "human life value" of the insured.51 This method is typ­
ically used in wrongful death litigation and seeks to measure a fam­
ily's potential loss based on factors such as the income earning 
potential of the insured over the insured's remaining employable 
years. This method includes consideration of factors frequently as­
sociated with disability insurance, such as the insured's age, occupa­
tion, and potential for increased or sustained earned income.52 
6. Financial Factors Methods 
Life insurance underwriters may consider economic life value, 
affordability, and existing insurance when determining the maxi­
mum insurance available.53 The economic life value factors consid­
ered include the apparent relationship of the insured's current 
income to the projected needs of the beneficiaries. 54 For example, 
a 36-year-old insured making $45,000 per year and providing the 
sole financial support to three young children could support insur­
ance coverage of $500,000 to $750,000 but not $10 million.55 
Life insurance underwriters may also judge the afford ability of 
coverage based on either the percentage of income rule (i.e., the 
20% rule) or factor tables.56 Insurers may use subjective percent­
age(s) of income as the basis to set the maximum amount that an 
applicant can afford to pay for coverage. Under the 20% rule, a 
maximum of 20% of the applicant's gross earned income can be 
used to pay modal life insurance premiums. Insurers may also use a 
periodically updated factor table showing the maximum amount of 
insurance available based on multiples of the applicant's· salary or 
total income and categorized by age.57 For instance, an insurer 
could use a factor table to conclude that a 25-year-old with a cur­
rent annual income of $30,000 should not obtain more than 
$480,000 (eighteen times average income) in life insurance (absent 
other factors indicating that the applicant's expected future income 
potential would support a higher amount of insurance).58 A pro­
posed insured may have currently in force an excessive amount of 
51. See John E. Scarborough, The Balance of Life, 94 LIFE ASS'N NEWS 68 (Jan. 
1999) (discussing difference between methods); see also Virginia Simon, Human Life 
Value vs. Needs Based Selling, LIFE & HEALlH ADVISOR (N. Eng), May 1999, at 4. 
52. See Scarborough, supra note 51. . 
53. BROWN, supra note 47, at 132-34; see also Kessler, supra note 44, at 544-45. 
54. BROWN, supra note 47, at 132-34. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 134-36. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
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insurance relative to his or her economic value.59 Insurers may in­
clude accidental death benefit coverage, personal insurance, and 
business insurance into these considerations.60 
7. Business Financial Factors Methods 
Business insurance needs feature many of the same factors 
considered for personal insurance. Financial assessment for busi­
ness insurance focuses on the financial condition of the business, its 
capacity to pay premiums, and the anticipated loss suffered by the 
death of the proposed insured.61 
C. Variable Products 
In addition to the general fairness standards,62 the NASD Con­
duct Rules and interpretations thereof establish the following ex­
tensive requirements for variable product suitability.63 
1. Variable Annuities 
The suitability analysis associated with the sale of variable an­
nuities has captured the attention of commentators,64 regulators, 
and the plaintiffs' bar.65 The NASD approach to variable annuity 
suitability expands otherwise applicable suitability analyses by 
"suggesting" that registered representatives consider the following 
best practices: 
• Make reasonable efforts to obtain comprehensive, complete, and 
accurate customer information, "including the customer's occu­
pation, marital status, age, number of dependents, investment 
objectives, risk tolerance, tax status, previous investment experi­
59. [d. 
60. [d. at 136. 
61. See id. at ch. 7. 
62. Fair Dealing with Customers, NASD Conduct Rule IM-2310-2, NASD Man­
ual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comiwbsINETbos.d11?Refshow?net=NASD4;&info=/goodbye.htm. 
63. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the NASD non-"sophisticated" securi­
ties investor suitability rule. See generally Suitability, NASD Conduct Rule 
2860(b)(19), NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comiwbsINETbos.d11?Refshow?net=NASD4;&info=/goodbye.htm. 
(defining suitability standards for option contracts); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-9(b) (2001) 
(establishing requirements for low-priced securities). 
64. See, e.g., David Snyder, Enforcement Spotlight: Variable Products, LIMRA's 
MARKETFAcrs, Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 10. 
65. See, e.g., Soranno v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 96 C 7882, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
14073, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2000) (discussing misrepresentations/omissions regard­
ing interest rates). 
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ence, liquid net worth, other investments and savings, and annual 
income."66 
• 	 "[R]eview the customer's investment objectives, risk tolerance, 
and other information to determine that the variable annuity 
. contract 	as a whole and the underlying sub accounts recom­
mended to the customer are suitable. "67 
• 	 "[C]ompare the information in the account application with other 
relevant information sources, e.g., an account information form, 
to check for apparent accuracy and consistency."68 
• 	Determine the duration of the customer's objectives inasmuch as 
short-term objectives may lead to surrender charges or penalties 
for early withdrawal under the Internal Revenue Code.69 . 
• 	 "[C]onduct an especially comprehensive suitability analysis prior 
to approving the sale of a variable annuity with surrender charges 
to a customer in a tax-qualified account subject to plan minimum 
distribution requirements."7o 
2. Variable Life Insurance 
In addition to the general securities suitability standards men­
tioned above, the NASD has provided the following non-exclusive 
factors that could be considered by producers in assessing suitabil­
ity requirements pertaining to variable life products: 
• A representation by the customer as to whether his or her life 
insurance needs have been met through existing life insurance;71 
• 	An express desire to buy an investment as compared to an insur­
ance product;72 
• A customer's understanding about how the premiums are allo­
cated among product costs and expenses and the complexity of 
variable insurance products generally;73 
• Affordability of premiums and the source 	of premium funding 
(i.e., policy financing);74· 
66. NTM 99-35, supra note 11, 'II 1. 
67. Id. 'II 4. See generally Booth, supra note 9, at 1605-09 (diversification). 
68. See NTM 99-35, supra note 11, 'II 4. 
69. See id. 'II 8. 
70. See id. 'II 12; see also United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Va­
riable Annuities: What You Should Know, at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/ 
varannty.htm (last modified Apr. 5, 2001). 
71. NTM 96-86, supra note 36. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. NTM 00-44, supra note 10. Policy financing involves the payment of premi­
ums through the use of loans of cash values from an existing policy for so long as the 
original policy can sustain such withdrawals. 
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• When the proceeds will be needed;7s 
• . Whether the product was sold for retirement needs;76 
• Customer investment sophistication and capability to monitor 
performance.77 
In contrast to the apparent reluctance to embrace a universal stan­
dard applicable to traditional products, state insurance laws do af­
firm the benefits of a clear suitability standard applicable to 
variable life products.7l:! In June 1974, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") adopted a definition of "suita­
bility" in the context of model variable life insurance regulation.79 
This definition was based on securities laws and a need to harmo­
nize such laws. with insurance regulations.so The following priorities 
were suggested for conducting this analysis: 
"Suitability" means the likelihood that the purchase of variable 
life insurance is reasonably consistent with: (1) the expressed in­
surance objectives and needs as perceived by the prospective in­
sured; (2) the reasonable objectives and needs of the prospective 
insured as determined objectively by a professional agent after a 
diligent reasonable inquiry into relevant financial, family and 
other background information concerning the prospective in­
sured; and (3) the potential that the prospective insured will per­
sist with the policy for such a period of time that the insurer's 
75. NTM 96-86, supra note 36. 
76. [d. 
77. See id. 
78. All insurers seeking to sell variable life insurance policies in a state that has 
adopted the NAIC Variable Life Insurance Model Regulation must also establish and 
maintain a written statement specifying its suitability standards. VARIABLE LIFE INS. 
MODEL REG. § 3(C), II NAIC Model Reg. Serv., 270-74 (Nat' I Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs, 
Inc.) (Jan. 1996). As of October, 1999, thirty-eight states have adopted either the model 
act or ,a related version of the same. [d. at 270-69 to -72. See generally Dist. Bus. 
Conduct Comm. for Dist. No.8 v. Cruz, No. C8A930048, 1997 WL 33101218 (Nat' I Bus. 
Conduct Comm. Oct. 31, 1997) (finding that suitability analysis must be performed to 
the product as a whole, not just the securities aspects of the product, and a registered 
representative has a responsibility to perform an independent suitability assessment). 
79. VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REG., at 270-32 to -33. Standards of Suitability 
adopted by the Board of Directors and filed with the Commissioner had to include a 
suitability requirement. Kessler, supra note 44, at 541. 
80. NAIC counsel summarized this initiative as follows: 
While the actual language ... is based on SEC Rule 15b 10-3, the concept of 
suitability is not foreign to insurance. In fact, those who saw the earlier drafts 
of the model regulation will recall that the suitability provisions were more 
extensive than at present. They were modified at the suggestion of several 
SEC staff members and insurance industry representatives who expressed con­
cern ensuing from a potential conflict between the NAIC and SEC 
requirements. 
Kessler, supra note 44, at 542 (footnote omitted). 
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acquisition costs are amortized over a reasonable period of 
time .... When variable life insurance meets characteristics (1) 
and (3) or (2) and (3), it is probably still "suitable" in most in­
stances .... Variable life insurance is clearly "unsuitable" when 
it meets none of the three characteristics for a given prospect .... 
Variable life insurance is probably "unsuitable" in the absence of 
extraordinary factors when it does not meet characteristic 
(3) . . . . Other situations must be judged on their individual 
facts.81 . 
In adopting the 1983 amendments to the Variable Life Insur­
ance Model Regulation, the NAIC recognized that the resulting 
proliferation of variable life insurance product designs might make 
suitability, and particularly factors (1) and (2), even more imp or­
tant.82 On the other hand, the NAIC understood that the possibil­
ity of more variable life insurance products designed to compete 
with investment-oriented products of other financial institutions 
would make persistency, as articulated in factor (3), less significant 
because policyholders would be more likely to move among com­
peting financial institution products for reasons such as rate of re­
turn, tax considerations, and economic conditions.83 As a result, 
the NAIC made persistency less relevant as a measure of 
suitability.84 
The decision to recoil from persistency85 is a noteworthy re­
treat from very strong sentiments about its overall relevance to suit­
ability analysis and the public image of the industry.86 The pre-1983 
version of the Model Act acknowledged that suitability was a diffi­
cult area to police and that an objective criterion, such as lapse 
rates, would be an accurate yardstick.87 Nine years later, however, 
these factors were considered to be irrelevant in traditional prod­
ucts88 and to suitability.89 A newer view blamed lapse rates on poli­
cyholders and non-producer related circumstances.9o In doing so, 
81. VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REo., at 270-32 to -33. 
82. Id. 
83. See id. at cmt. 
84. See Kessler, supra note 44, at 542. 
85. See id. at 543. 
86. Id. 
87. VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REo., at 270-32 to -33; see also Kessler, supra 
note 44, at 541 ("The inclusion of a suitability provision was in partial response to a 
concern of the NAIC that variable life insurance might be missold and/or oversold, with 
the resultant possibility that early lapses might be numerous."). 
88. VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL REo., at 270-32 to -33. 
89. Id. at 270-34. 
90. See id. 
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this view disregarded the previous subcommittee's call "for insur­
ance regulators to require and instill in insurers the commitment to 
underwrite for suitability (including persistency) ... for the benefit 
of themselves, their agents, the policyholders, and the public."91 
D. Transaction Specific Suitability Standards 
Various regulatory bodies have adopted regulations and issued 
warnings92 to deter twisting and indiscriminate replacements93 of 
one insurance product for another. These admonitions have also 
been applied to replacing bonus annuities on the presence of a "bo­
nus credit" (i.e., features that offer the investor an immediate credit 
equal to a percentage of purchase payments that may otherwise off­
set applicable contingent deferred sales charges pertaining to the 
early surrender of an existing annuity).94 
According to the New York legislature, replacements are a 
"special circumstance in which insurance consumers need addi­
tional protections to avoid adverse consequences."95 New York's 
"minimum standards of conduct" for transactions considered 
"replacements" require producers to make available "full and clear 
information in which an applicant can make an informed decision in 
his or her own best interest."96 The "full and clear information" 
needed for the customer to make an "informed decision" repre­
sents a disclosure-oriented approach that shifts responsibility to the 
customer through the provision of prescribed disclosures, provided 
that the producer and manufacturer can demonstrate that a needs 
91. Kessler, supra note 44, at 546. 
92. See, e.g., Paul Roye, Director, Division of Investment of Management, U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Commission, Understanding the Securities Products of Insur­
ance Companies, Keynote address before the Practicing Law Institute (Jan. 9, 2001) 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechlspch455.htm; State of N.Y., Insurance De­
partment, Circular Letter No. 21 (June 21, 2000), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ 
clOO_21.htm. 
93. For a generally accepted definition of the term "replacements," see N.Y. 
COMPo CODES R. & REGs., tit. 11, § 51.2(a) (1998). 
94. See Recommendations to Customers (Suitability), supra note 7. 
95. N.Y. INS. DEP'T, supra note 40, at 9. 
96. N.Y. COMPo CODES R. & REGS., tit. 11, § 51.1(b) (1998); see also LIFE INS. & 
ANNUITIES REPLACEMENT MODEL REG. § 1(A)(2)(a), III NAIC Model Reg. Servo 613­
1 (July 2000); NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 302 (detailing best interest test applied to 
replacement of variable life products). See generally 1MSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, 
supra note 44, at 62, 67; James M. Carson & Mark D. Forster, Suitability and Life Insur­
ance Policy Replacement: An Analytical Tool, 18 J. INS. REG. 427447, July 1, 2000, 2000 
WL 21046589 (providing critical analysis of Life Insurance and Annuities Replacement 
Model Regulation). 
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analysis occurred.97 Worksheets98 and other materials have there­
fore been developed to better document the basis for recommenda­
tions described in such state mandated disclosure forms.99 
The NASD's approach to variable product replacements also 
generally follows this quasi-disclosure approach. NASD Notice to 
Members 99-35 expands disclosure duties by obligating registered 
representatives, broker-dealers1oo and wholesalers101 to ensure the 
suitability of a variable annuity replacement102 by considering 
whether such matters as product enhancements and improvements, 
lower cost structures, and surrender charges justify a replacement 
of an existing annuity.103 For instance, a producer replacing one 
annuity with another based on the performance of the former must 
97. See LIFE INS. & ANNUITIES REPLACEMENT MODEL REG., § 1(A)(2)(b) & app. 
A, at 613-11; NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 302 (describing replacement forms). 
98. See generally NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 302; Books and Records, NASD 
Conduct Rule 3110, NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998) available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.d11?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&info=/goodbye.htm 
(requiring brokers to maintain customer account information regarding the nature of 
the customer and their authority); Diligence as to Accounts, N.Y.S.E. Rule 405(1), 2 
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 'lI 2405, at 3696 (Aug. 1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240:15c2­
5(a)(2)(1999)(equity funding programs); 17 C.F.R. § 24D.15g-9(b)(3) (penny stocks); 
Anderson & Winslow, supra note 9, at 120 (stating that customers should receive writ­
ten confirmation of their expressed investment objectives). 
99. See, e.g., N.Y. Regulation 60, 11 N.Y.C.R.R. App. lOA & lOB (1998) (con­
taining in its disclosure forms questions that must be completed by all producers effect­
ing a "replacement": (1) What are the primary reason(s) for this recommendation; (2) 
Why can't the existing product meet the customer's objective; (3) What are the advan­
tages of continuing the existing products without changes); see also LIFE INS. & ANNUl· 
TIES REPLACEMENT MODEL REG., apps. A-C, at 613-12 to -15. 
100. See NTM 99-35, supra note 11, at subdiv. 16 (stating that a retail member 
should adopt other measures reasonably designed to ensure that replacement sales ac­
tivity by its registered representatives complies with NASD rules). 
101. See id. 
Members that "wholesale" variable annuities are reminded that they are also 
subject to NASD rules, and that they should avoid marketing strategies that 
are designed primarily to encourage inappropriate replacement sales. Upon 
reasonable request and to the extent practical, wholesale members should as­
sist retail broker/dealers in monitoring the replacement activity of their 
customers. 
Id. The foregoing leaves open the question of whether the wholesaler must refuse to 
cooperate with a manufacturer who developed a marketing strategy that could run 
afoul of this prohibition. 
102. Exchange Act Rule 15g-9, 17 C.F.R. §240.15g-9(b) (1999); Investor Tips, 
Variable Annuities: What You Should Know" 
at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm; NTM 99-35, supra note 11, at subdiv. 
14; see also NASD Regulation Investor Alert, Should You Exchange Your Variable 
Annuity?, at http://www.nasdr.com:80/alerc02-01.htm. 
103. NTM 99-35, supra note 11, at subdiv. 14. 
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be prepared to defend his or her sale104 on the basis that, among 
other things, the former annuity had been substantially under-per­
forming relative to its peers for a substantial time period. 
II. SUITABILITY BASED LIABILITY 
Suitability claims account for the vast majority of the filings 
under NASD members' errors and omissions policies.105 One com­
mentator noted that suitability has evolved into a duty without a 
standard.106 This duty has been described as one of care,107 to 
warn,108 monitor,109 protect,110 improve,111 and even prevent "eco­
nomic suicide."112 Recommendations carry an "implicit warranty 
of soundness"113 or something in the nature of a "warranty of fit­
ness for a particular purpose."114 Proof 'of meeting the quest for 
equifinite results satisfying this ethical mandate115 is measured ex­
post facto, at the urging of a hapless customer116 by arbitrators.117 
Moreover, these arbitrators consider the ex ante expectations of the 
104. See NTM 01-23, supra note 11, at nA. 
105. Zarb Urges Broker-Dealers to 'Be on Guard' About Suitability, 30 Sec. Reg. 
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 810 (May 29, 1998); see also Press Release, NASD Regula­
tion, Inc., NASD Regulation Files Six Enforcement Actions Involving Marketing and 
Sales of Variable Annuities (Feb. 15,2001) (on file with author). 
106. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 191-92. 
107. Id. at 190-91. 
108. Id. at 212-27. 
109. Id. 
110. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 806-07 (discussing the duty to invest prudently, not 
speculate, diversify, and seek productive portfolios in guidelines). 
111. See id. at 806 (asserting increased productivity as one of many vague 
guidelines). 
112. Rapp, supra note 9, at 212-27 (stating that economic suicide could be de­
scribed as making fool-hearty investments leading to financial ruin). 
113. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring). 
114. Mundheim, supra note 9, at 452. 
115. The Securities and Exchange Commission has interpreted NASD suitability 
standards as being an ethical yardstick for measuring producer conduct. See In re 
Burkes, 51 S.E.c. 356, 360 (1993); Mundheim, supra note 9, at 464-67 (noting that the 
concept of suitability originated, and was intended to remain, as an ethical principle). 
116. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 191-92, 212 n.94. 
117. Suitability claims are more likely to be addressed through arbitration follow­
ing the U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See ShearsonfAm. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriquez de Quijas v. ShearsonfAm. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 
(1989). See generally Rapp, supra note 9, at 192 n.9 (stating that arbitration panels now 
decide most suitability claims). Courts and juries have been criticized as being poor 
arbiters of suitability based on their proclivity to craft unintended remedies through the 
application of equitable principles such as the rule of contra profentum, the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and common law detrimental reliance. This is 
an unfortunate result as "[c]ourts are institutionally ill-suited" to make these types of 
decisions based on their ex post litigation perspective. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. An­
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producer, and not the customer,11s on a case-by-case, investment­
by-investment basis,119 unrestrained by precedent or consistency.12o 
A variety of theories or initiatives have been proffered in sup­
port of holding producers liable for the outcomes of their recom­
mendations. It is too early to tell how functional regulatory powers 
vested under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,121 and the overall con­
straints now placed on state legislatures in adopting or amending 
suitability guidelines,122 will expand· or curtail these bases for 
exposure. 
A. The Shingle Theory 
But what about this man who sells insurance? Surely his persis­
tency is part of American Folklore, whether it is his foot, which is 
in the door, his calendar in the mail, or his voice in the telephone 
receiver. Professional man or salesman? Which is he? A man on 
his own or someone else's man? A huckster in the marketplace 
or an expert on whom you can rely?123 
Producers have been held accountable for unsuitable sales and 
overall breach of fairness standards under a so-called "shingle the­
ory. "124 By "hanging out" his or her shingle, and holding himself or 
derson, Health Insurers' Assessment ofMedical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637,1679 
(1992). 
118. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 213. 
119. See id. at 191 n.5, 241 (considering suitability based on overall portfolio). 
120. See id. at 216-17, 263 n.315, 264-78 (discussing the shortcomings of the ex­
isting regulations and proposed remedies). 
121. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, § 301, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (pro­
viding that insurance activities of any persons shall be "functionally" regulated by the 
States subject to section 104 of the Act); id. tit. III, subtitle A (permitting national 
banks to engage in certain additional insurance activities); id. § 305 (amending the Fed­
eral Deposit Insurance Act by requiring that Federal banking agencies publish cus­
tomer protection regulations applicable to retail sales practices and solicitations by 
November 12, 2000, including "Customer Protection Disclosures" that will alert con­
sumers to investment risks associated with variable products). 
122. Suitability is not among the thirteen general safe harbors with respect to 
state laws that may not be pre-empted. See id. § 104(d)(2)(B). Those statutes existing 
prior to September 3, 1998, will continue to benefit from the reverse preemption appli­
cation of the McCarran-Furgeson Act. See id. § 104(d)(2)(C)(i). All other attempts to 
enact state laws in regard to bank sold insurance products will be affected by the legal 
standards for preemption set forth in Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 
U.S. 25, 28-37 (1996). 
123. Thomas J. Ziomek & Jane O. McCahill, Legal Liability of Agents and Bro­
kers, J. FIN. SERVo PROFS. 64, 66 (Jan. 1999) (quoting Bartram Hartnett, RESPONSIBILI­
TIES OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND BROKERS § 1.01 (1997». 
124. Phillip E. Stano & Carl B. Wilkerson, A Discussion of Insurers' Vicarious 
Liability for Agents' Wrongdoing, 6 NAT'L. INS. L. REV. 809, 845-47 (1993). See gener­
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herself out as someone who is knowledgeable about financial prod­
ucts, the producer implies that he Or she will deal fairly with cus­
tomers according to the standards and practices of the 
professionps Accordingly, a producer's business card and direc­
tory listing can be a basis for customers to expect that the producer 
would not recommend products with no reasonable basis to support 
such a recommendation.126 
In addition to producer exposure under this theory, one can 
argue that in certain instances, manufacturers could be held respon­
sible for their producers. For example, an advertisement used to 
promote producers as "financial advisers" could support a claim 
against the manufacturer when the producers do not have the req­
uisite credentials supporting this designation.127 General agency 
law,128 concepts of respondeat superior,129 and the implied cove-
ally Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 143 (2d Cir. 1963); Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 
(9th Cir. 1961); In re Tallman, Exchange Act Release No. 8830, [1969-1970 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 77,800, at 83,848 (Mar. 2, 1970); In re Whitman & 
Stirling Co., 43 S.E.C. 181, 182-83 (1966); Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1A­
1406,56 S.E.c. Docket (CCH) 724, 725 n.6 (Mar. 16; 1994) (applying shingle theory to 
investment advisers); REpORT OF COMM'R LAURA S. UNGER TO THE U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM'N, H.R. Doc. No. 95, at 238 (1st Sess. 1963) (A 1963 Securities and Ex­
change Commission Special Study of the Securities Markets specifically identified suita­
bility as a distinct doctrine giving rise to both a legal obligation under antifraud 
provisions and an ethical duty under SRO rules). One commentator has noted that use 
of designations such as "fmancial adviser" or "financial consultant" is tantamount to 
invitations for suitability claims under the shingle theory. See Rapp, supra note 9, at 
190 n.3, 196-202, 263. These claims become especially colorable when producers act as 
"financial interior decorators" by performing simplistic matching of generic client types 
with generic types of investments. Id. at 221-22, 237-38; see also RULES GOVERNING 
THE ADVERTISING OF LIFE INSURANCE § 5(N), III NAIC Model Reg. Servo 570-5 (Nat'I 
Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (Apr. 1995). For a discussion of the shingle theory in the context 
of a negligence and fraud claim, see Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 402-05 (Ariz. 1984). 
125.. Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124, at 846; see Charles Hughes & Co. v. 
SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1943); Burke A. Christensen, Agents and Brokers, in 
MCGILL'S LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE 246-47 (Edward E. Graves & Burke A. 
Christensen eds., 1996); Eileen B. Eglin & Richard J. Rogers, Agents' and Brokers' 
Liability; Understanding Their Integral Role, in INSURANCE LAW-WHAT EVERY LAW­
YER AND BUSINESSPERSON NEEDS TO KNow 111, 116.(1997); 8 HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE 2D § 52.2(B), at 420-23 (1998). 
126. See Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124, at 846. 
127. See generally ADVERTISEMENTS OF LIFE INS. & ANNumES MODEL REG. 
§ 5(N), III NAIC Model Reg. Servo 570-5 (Nat' I Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (July 2000). 
128. See Christensen, supra note 125, at 232; Dan M. McGill, Waiver, Estoppel, 
and Election by the Insurer, in MCGILL'S LIFE INSURANCE 803 (Edward E. Graves ed., 
1994). 
129. See generally Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 13-15; Christen­
sen, supra note 125, at 244-47; Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124 (discussing vicarious 
liability under respondeat superior doctrine). 
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nant of good faith and fair dealing130 also provide potential bases 
for claims against manufacturers.131 
B. Fraud Theories 
The Ninth Circuit, in Anderson v. Knox, first endorsed the en­
forcement of suitability requirements as a fraud concept in the con­
text of an insurance policy.132 In that case, a producer who had 
induced a customer to purchase excessive amounts of bank-fi­
nanced insurance was liable for damages because the policies were 
unsuitable to the plaintiff's needs.133 Common law fraud theories, 
as compared to the anti-fraud provisions of Rule lOb-5 of the Se­
curities Exchange Act,134 may also find favor with customers based 
on their appeal to arbitrators135 and the relative ease with which 
130. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.2(a)(2) at 
624-26 (Practitioner's ed. 1988); Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124, at 846; see also 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'll 22,725, at 16,610 (Apr. 16, 1997). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
applied to insurance contracts does not merely "connote the absence ... of positive 
misconduct of a malicious or immoral nature," it demands that the insurer act reasona­
bly to fulfill the justified expectations of the other party. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 
Cal. 3d 910, 922 n.5, 925 (1978). See generally U.C.c. § 1-203 (West Supp. 1999) (re­
quiring good faith performance of all contracts); 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 198:14 
(Dec. 1999) (comparing good faith and fiduciary duties). 
131. See Part II.D. 
132. 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961). See generally VARIABLE LIFE INS. MODEL 
REG. § 4(D) cmts., II NAIC Model Reg. Serv., 270-34 (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (Jan. 
1996) ("[T]he commissioner as a practical matter probably possesses ~he power to re­
scind a sale based on a material misrepresentation. Common law fraud causes of action, 
as well as implied rights of action, also may exist depending on the law of each individ­
ual state."). But see Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 
1016 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that justifiable reliance was needed to substantiate a com­
mon law fraud claim). 
133. Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d702, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1961). 
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1998); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
§§ 10(b) & 15(c), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j(b) & 780(c)(I) (West Supp. 1999); Rule 15c1-2, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1999). The elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim are: "(a) a false repre­
sentation of (b) a material (c) fact; (d) defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of 
its falsity and their intention that plaintiff rely on it; (e) plaintiff's reasonable reliance 
thereon; and (f) plaintiff's resulting loss." Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d 644, 649 (3d 
Cir. 1991); see also Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 E2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1993); 
O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 897 (10th Cir. 1992); Clark v. John 
Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that a violation of 
NASD suitability rule may not be a per se violation of Rule 10b-5); Booth, supra note 9, 
at 1602-05; Langevoort, supra note 16, at 889-903; Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 
9, at 1585-89. 
135. Prior to its rescission in 1983, salespeople who were not members of a self­
regulatory authority were bound by the suitability provisions of Rule 15blO-3 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Exchange Act Release No. 20,409 (Nov. 22, 1983), 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] (CCH) 'll 83,457 (Dec. 7, 1983); see 15 
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they can be pleaded.136 Nevertheless, courts borrow heavily from 
securities laws when analyzing fraud claims.137 The factors consid­
ered in framing a fraud claim therefore include misrepresentation! 
omission,138 reliance,139 and possibly scienter.14o 
U.S.c.A.. § 78o-3v (West Supp. 1999). Presently, the principal forum for addressing 
private actions for damages based on suitability has shifted to the arbitration tribunals 
of the NASD and other self-regulatory organizations and tribunals. See Booth, supra 
note 9, at 1600 n.6, 1604; Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1584, 1593-97; Rapp, 
supra note 9, at 192 n.9. 
136. See FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (stating that fraud must be stated with particularity 
whereas intent, knowledge, and other conditions of the mind of a person may be 
averred generally); see also In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 
975 F. Supp. 584, 596-98, 613-15 (D.N.J. 1996); Berent v. Kemper Corp., 780 F. Supp. 
431,440-41 (E.D. Mich. 1991) affd, 973 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1992). See generally Brown 
v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Analytically, an unsuit­
ability claim is a subset of the ordinary § lO(b) fraud claim in which a plaintiff must 
allege, inter alia, (1) material misstatements or omissions, (2) indicating an intent to 
deceive or defraud, (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security."); Farlow 
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986-87 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Sears v. 
Likens, 912 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1990» (ruling that pleadings must state "what misrepre­
sentations were made by the defendant, to whom these misrepresentations were made, 
when these misrepresentations were made, or how these misrepresentations furthered 
the alleged fraudulent scheme"); Olpin v. Ideal Nat'l Ins. Co., 419 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 
1969) (finding that life insurance policies are not securities under the Securities Act 
thereby eliminating a cause of action under the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act); Assocs. in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.c. v. Home Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 
729 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 941 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1991) (to like effect); 
Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 611 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd in part, 
rev'd in part, 814 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing anti-fraud claims dismissed be­
cause subject annuities came within Securities Act exemption). 
137. See In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 
584, 613 (D.N.J. 1996); see also Booth, supra note 9, at 1603 n.20; Lowenfels & Brom­
berg, supra note 9, at 1589-91; Letter from Donald J. Walters, Senior Counsel, Ameri­
can Council of Life Insurance, to Carolyn Johnson, supra note 43, at 6 (stating that Rule 
10b-5 fraud analysis is inapposite to suitability analysis). 
Customers may find that class action suitability claims must be framed in terms of 
Rule lOb-5 claims in order to avoid federal civil procedure impediments imposed under 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.c.A. §§ 77z-1 to 78u-4 
(West 1994 & Supp. 2001). See Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 
101 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding alleged misrepresentation of the tax benefits of variable 
annuities when purchased through tax-qualified investment plans and failure to disclose 
fees). 
138. See In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 
at 613-14. 
139. Id. at 613-15; see also Brown v. Lockwood, 432 N.Y.S.2d 186, 193-95 (App. 
Div.1980). 
140. See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978); 
see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.c.A. § 78j-l (West Supp. 
1999) (requiring that private litigants suing under Rule lOb-5 must plead scienter with 
particularity and without the benefit of discovery); Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 
9, at 1588-89; In re Olde Disc. Corp., Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 40423, 1998 
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C. Fiduciary Liability 
In addition to the shingle and fraud theories, producers may be 
held liable as fiduciaries. Producers have been measured under 
standards as someone with a higher than ordinary sense of care,141 
similar to priests,142 common law fiduciaries,143 professionals,144 ex­
WL575171, at *21 (1998) (holding that broker's management environment encouraged 
unsuitable sales). ' 
141. See HOLMES, supra note 125, at 420-23. See generally SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (stating that an investment adviser is a 
fiduciary and has an affirmative duty of "good faith" and "full and fair disclosure of all 
material facts" to each client); Kessler, supra note 44, at 54l. 
142. See Myles A. Tracy, Insurance and Theology, 33 J. RISK & INS. 85, 91 (1966); 
Alexander Welsh, The Agent As Priest, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1574, 1576 (1963). 
Associations between insurance solicitation and religious organizations and concepts 
can be traced back to the formation of the first U.S. life insurance company in 1759 by 
the Presbyterian Synod of Philadelphia and the use of collective trusts by religious 
guilds. J. OWEN STALSON, MARKETING LIFE INSURANCE 34, 44 (1942). Episcopalians 
established their own company in 1769. Michael D. White, True Believers, NAT'L UN­
DERWRITER, Sept. 13, 1993, at 19 (Life & HealthlFinancial Services ed.). In the nine­
teenth century, American Revivalists objected to the sale of life insurance on 
"religious" grounds on the basis that, among other things, it tempted divine Providence. 
See JOHN GUDMUNDSEN, THE GREAT PROVIDER 44 (1959); STALSON, supra at 67, 150; 
VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS & MARKETS 73-79 (1983). Several marketing 
approaches were developed to overcome this obstacle. First, the concept of Providence 
was reinterpreted as an active responsibility to use human foresight to safeguard the 
future. See generally SOLOMON S. HEUBNER, LIFE INSURANCE 23 (4th ed. 1950). Sec­
ond, the insurance companies developed marketing ~erminology that resonated in relig­
ious imagery. See Carole King, Religion of Life Insurance Needs Revival in New Form, 
NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Dec. 18, 1995, at 7 (Life & HealthlFinancial Services ed.), availa­
ble at 1995 WL 11948458; ZELIZER, supra at 122-39. 
143. See also HOLMES, supra note 125; Booth, supra note 9, at 1602-05; Lowenfels 
& Bromberg, supra note 9, at 1591-92. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY §§ 1, 13, 387, 393-94, 399-401, 407, 425 (1958). For blue sky laws specifically 
identifying investment advisors as fiduciaries, see IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 710, r. 1-16­
22(a), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) <JI 24,613M, at 19,475-17 (Jul. 1999); MD. BLUE SKY 
REG. r. 03(B), 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) <JI 30,453, at 25,4279-80 (Mar. 2002); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 18-15-2 to -4,02 (2000) (banks and trustees). See generally Christensen, supra 
note 125, at 244-47. For cases and articles that consider whether a producer is a fiduci­
ary, see Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. 
Mich. 1978), affd, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that discretionary account se­
curities brokers become fiduciaries); In re First Secs. Corp., 40 S.E.c. 589, 590 (1961) 
(finding that excessive trading (churning) is a breach of a registered representative's 
"position of trust" under a duty to act in the customer's best interests); Beardmore v. 
Abbott, 218 So.2d 807, 809 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (producer fiduciary); Kanter v. 
Deitelbaum, 648 N.E.2d 1137, 1139 (Ill. App. 1995) ("The relationship between an in­
sured and his [health insurance] broker, acting as the insured's agent, is a fiduciary one, 
despite the fact that the broker may be compensated by a third party."); Coping with 
the Crash: A Step-by-Step Guide to Investor Rights, NASAA Reports (CCH) <JI12,121, at 
12,127 (1987) (analogy to trustee); Burke A. Christensen, Insurance Agent or Broker 
Liability to the Insured, 10 J. INS. REG. 313-41 (Spr. 1992); Eileen B. Eglin & Richard J. 
Rogers, Agents' and Brokers' Liability: Understanding Their Integral Role, in INSUR. 
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perts,145 fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement Income Secur­
ity Act of 1974 (ERISA),146 or trustees.147 The ratcheting fidelity 
thresholds associated with each of these labels present special con-
ANCE LAW-WHAT EVERY LAWYER AND BUSINESSPERSON NEEDS TO KNOW 111, 115-18 
(1997); Ziomek & McCahill, supra note 123, at 64, 66. But see In re The Prudential Ins. 
Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 584, 616-18 (D. N.J. 1996) (dismissing 
claims that producers or insurer owed a fiduciary duty to insureds); Anderson & Wins­
low, supra note 9, at 107 n.15; Booth, supra note 9, at 1604 n.23, 1605 n.26; Rapp, supra 
note 9, at 194-217 (discussing history of use of fiduciary concepts relative to suitability); 
cf U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINE'S MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k)(7)(ii) (1998). 
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958) (requiring exercise of 
skill and care normally possessed by other professionals); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 299A (1965). 
145. See supra Part II.A. for a discussion of the shingle theory. 
146. 29 U.S.c. § 1002(21)(A) (1994). Congress and courts have interpreted fiduci­
ary status in terms of a functional standard based on actual facts and circumstances. See 
Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 613 (7th 
Cir. 1995); 120 CONGo REc. 3977, 3983 (Feb. 25, 1974); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3­
21(c)(1)(1999); see also 29 U.S.c. § 1104(a)(1) (1994) (An ERISA fiduciary must "dis­
charge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum­
stances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with 
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like 
aims."); 29 U.S.C. § 1l06(b) (1994) (ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciaries from 
"deal[ing] with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account," or 
"receiv[ing] any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with 
such plan in connection with a transaction involving the assets of the plan."); 29 U.S.c. 
§ 1109(a) (1994) (personal liability results from violation of fiduciary duty); NLRB V. 
Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1981) (An ERISA's fiduciary duty is the most 
fundamental of his or her duties, and "must be enforced with uncompromising rigid­
ity."); Schloegel V. Boswell, 994 F.2d 266, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1993); Lowen V. Tower Asset 
Mgmt, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1213 (2d Cir. 1987) (This duty, the violation of which sub­
jects a fiduciary to personal liability, is directed particularly at schemes "tainted by a 
conflict of interest and thus highly susceptible to self dealing."); Donovan V. Bierwirth, 
680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) (The requirement that an ERISA fiduciary act "with an 
eye single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries."); H.R. CONF. REp. No. 
1280; Interpretive Bulletin 96-1, 29 C.F.R. Part 2509.96-1(d)(1999); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 425(b) (1958); Lisa S. Kahn & Laura M. Metcalfe, The Broker­
Dealer As Fiduciary Under ERISA: Defending Claims by ERISA Plans for Recovery of 
Their Trading Losses, in 3 INVESTMENT LAW. 8,9 (Sept. 1996); cf 29 U.S.c. § 1002(38) 
(1994) (defining "investment manager"); Martin V. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669 (8th Cir. 
1992) (discussing accountants providing recommendations regarding transactions and 
investment advice found to be fiduciaries); Miller V. Lay Trucking Co., 606 F. Supp. 
1326 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 989 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding insurance agent unin­
tentionally listed as plan administrator and who provided investment and other advice 
to be a fiduciary); Brink V. DaLesio, 496 F. Supp. 1350, 1374-75 (D. Md. 1980) (finding 
insurance agent to be a fiduciary based on discretionary authority and customer reli­
ance on advice rendered). See generally Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 9, at 
1591-92 (discussing how the thin line between investment advice constituting effective 
control or mere influence is therefore critical to establishing fiduciary status). 
147. See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 173-174, 181, 227,230-31 (1959). 
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cern as contractual relations and commission arrangements argua­
bly taint producers' loyalties.148 The characterization of a 
producer's fidelity to his or her customer as either that of an ordi­
nary person, or alternatively, that of a fiduciary, can have a dra­
matic effect on whether a court will apply either a de novo or an 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.149 
Courts have also struggled to impute a fidelity standard appli­
cable to producers through analogies to the duty of an attorney or 
accountant to his or her c1ients,15o Unfortunately, since neither at­
torneys151 nor accountants152 are bound by a clear code of conduct 
that acknowledges the presumably paramount interests of custom­
148. The present front-end commission structure used by insurance companies 
has been viewed as a possible source of conflict of interest for producers in fulfilling 
their duties to customers. See Ronald l)uskli, The Ethics of Reward Systems in the 
Financial Services Industry, Address at The Americlin College (Aug. 25, 1998) (tran~ 
script on file with author). Most insurance companies pay a significant portion of the 
first year's premium to the producer as a commission with nominal "trail" commissions 
paid over subsequent years. In contrast, a "leveled" commission structure pays a lower 
flat commission to the producer over a longer time period. See Ke~sler, supra note 44, 
at 546; I.M.S.A. Indicator 5.3.b.3, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 78 
(using persistency trends used to identify root causes of complaints). See generally An­
derson & Winslow, supra note 9, at 108 (describing churning cases); Booth, supra note 
9, at 1603 n.20 (explaining that churning arises in the context of a breach of fiduciary 
duty for unsuitable recommendations based on the producer's failure to disclose the 
fact that the reason for the trading is to benefit the broker (through commissions) 
rather than the customer); id. at 1610 (explaining that brokers sometimes recommend 
riskier securities because they are paid higher commissions). Studies have shown, how­
ever, that commissions do not necessarily motivate producers in recommending prod­
ucts to their customers. See Duska, supra, at 7 n.lO (citing comments from the 1998 
Zicklin CenterlWharton Impact Conference of Ethical Issues in Financial Services). 
Rather, moral belief in the welfare of others, behavioral controls, and the operative 
business environment were better determinative factors for producer conduct. Id. at 7­
8. 
149. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). 
150. See Kanter v. Dietelbaum, 648 N.E.2d 1137, 1139-40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); 
Brown v. Lockwood, 432 N.Y.S.2d 186 (App. Div. 1980); HOLMES, supra note 125; see 
also Kessler, supra note 44, at 541 ("The duties and liabilities of the insurance agent are 
basically the same as in the c'ase of other pr:ofessionals. The agent must act in good 
faith ... and exercise such reasonable skill and ordinary diligence as may be fairly 
expected from a person in his situation."). 
151. Attorneys are not bound by a professional code to ,hold their customers' 
interest paramount. See, e.g., CONN. CT. R.P.C. 1.7. Lawyers may enter into business 
relations that may be adverse to a customer provided the terms are fair and reasonable 
to the customer (as disclosed in an understandable written disclosure) and the customer 
agrees in writing to the same. See CONN. CT. R.P.c. 1.8. 
152. See generally CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 20-280-15c(a), (b) & (e) (1998) 
(stating that certified public accountants must be independent and act with integrity and 
objectivity). 
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ers, such as the Hippocratic Oath,153 the exact degree of loyalty of a 
producer to stand in support of his or her recommendations re­
mains uncertain. 
D. Market Conduct Oversight 
Two of the ways that the life insurance industry has attempted 
to indirectly control suitability as a form of market conduct include 
the adoption of broad-based trade practice regulations and the es­
tablishment of self-regulatory standards. The core of state regula­
tory efforts to oversee market conduct is embodied in various forms 
of the NAIC Model Unfair Trade Practices Act, which has been 
adopted by most states.154 The Unfair Trade Practices Act was 
adopted based on the specific invitation of Congress155 and "to as­
sure the ouster of [Federal Trade Commission] jurisdiction."156 The 
act is notable for many reasons including its breadth and penal­
ties.157 One commentator also characterized the act as a "code of 
ethics" for the insurance business.158 The act indirectly regulates 
suitability through prohibitions against general misrepresent a­
tions,159 misrepresenting a producer's qualifications to provide in­
vestment advice,160 and defaming another insurer.161 
The Insurance Marketplace Standards Association ("IMSA") 
was established to promote ethical marketplace conduct,162 thereby 
153. For instance, the Oath of Hippocrates setting forth the duties of a physician 
to patients includes "I will follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability 
and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is 
deleterious and mischievous." BLAKISTON'S NEW GOULD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (1st 
ed. 1953). 
154. See Unfair Trade Practices Act § 4(A) & (C), V NAIC Model Reg. Servo 
880-2 to -3 (Jan. 1993); see also Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act § 4(A), V NAIC 
Model Reg. Servo 900-2 (July 1991). See generally Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 
9, at 1593 (construing blue sky laws to include suitability). 
155. See Unfair Trade Practices Act §1, V NAIC Model Reg. Servo at 880-1 (Jan. 
1993). 
156. Legislative History, Unfair Trade Practices Act, supra note 154, at 880-19; 
see JON S. HANSON, REGULATION OF THE LIFE INSURANCE BUSINESS 97 (1996). 
157. See Unfair Trade Practices Act, supra note 154, §§ 6-11. See generally HAN­
SON, supra note 156, at 123-25; Burke A. Christensen, Advertising and Privacy, in Mc­
GILL'S LEGAL ASPECTS OF LIFE INSURANCE 259-60 (Edward E. Graves & Burke A. 
Christensen eds., 1996). 
158. HANSON, supra note 156, at 98. 
159. See Unfair Trade Practices Act, supra note 154, § 4(A). 
160. See id. § 4(M). 
161. See id. § 4(C). 
162. IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 1. The Securities and Ex­
change Commission has interpreted NASD suitability standards as being an ethical 
yardstick for measuring producer conduct. See In re Burkes, 51 S.E.C. 356, 360 (1993), 
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bolstering consumer confidence in the life insurance industry.163 
Prerequisites to membership include, among other things, certifying 
that the member thoroughly embraces the importance of suitability 
by teaching producers about suitability,164 monitoring whether pro~ 
ducers use "needs based" selling concepts to ensure the suitability 
of their recommendations,165 prohibiting improper replacements,166 
and discouraging defamatory statements regarding another 
company.167 
E. Common Law Detrimental Reliance 
The doctrine of detrimental reliance has also found wide-scale 
favor in resolving disputes involving presumed ambiguities in con­
nection with the type or scope of insurance sold.168 There is no 
reason to suspect that this equitable concept could not be applied, 
directly or indirectly, to suitability claims. The insured must prove 
the essential elements of a reliance claim, including that a represen­
tation, promise or other act existed,169 that the maker of the repre­
sentation expected others to rely on such representation, that the 
recipient justifiably relied on such representation to his or her detri­
ment, and, as a result, that the recipient/insured suffered some ad­
verse consequence.170 
affd 29 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1994); Mundheim, supra note 9, at 464-66 (noting that the 
concept of suitability originated, and was intended to remain, as an ethical principle). 
163. Robert E. Googins, IMSA Delivers Consumer Confidence, GAMA INT'L J. 
40 (Nov.-Dec. 1998). 
164. See IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 54 (advocating train­
ing procedures to ensure that employees understand the suitability requirements). 
165. See IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 43-46, 55 (describing 
practices that companies should follow to monitor their sales employees). 
166. See IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 62. 
167. IMSA Principle 3 requires that producers and insurers refrain from disparag­
ing competitors. IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 65. 
168. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.5(a) (Practi­
tioner's ed. 1988). For a general discussion of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, 
see Kenneth S. Abraham, fudge-Made Law and fudge-Made Insurance: Ho~wring The 
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REv. 1151 (1981); Roger C. Hender­
son, The Doctrine ofReasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 
OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 
CONN. L. REv. 323 (1986); Peter N. Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the 
Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. LJ. 729 (2000). 
169. This may take the form of an express or implied statement that a recommen­
dation is suitable. Producers may be a source of exposure to manufacturers especially 
where customer expectations are not managed properly and a customer is simply led to 
a single product. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.5(c) 
nA (Practitioner's ed. 1988). 
170. See Davidson v. Wilson, 973 F.2d 1391, 1400 (8th Cir. 1992); Myers v. Finkle, 
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III. THE SEARCH FOR A UNIVERSAL PARADIGM 
The absence of a universal suitability paradigm is a problem 
for customers and producers/manufacturers171 alike. As the preced­
ing discussion indicates, suitability standards may depend on 
whether the customer is vulnerable, astute, or rich. Different stan­
dards apply if the product recommended is a traditional product, 
variable product or a replacement product. The purchase of a varia­
ble product from within a bank is subject to one set of rules that 
have no relevance to the purchase of the very same product from 
the broker-dealer next door. The sale of a traditional product is 
subject to altogether different procedures depending on whether it 
is sold at a bank branch, the broker-dealer next door, the law firm 
around the corner, or the insurance agency across town. These 
rules also change when crossing state lines and may have absolutely 
no application to products online. 
Compliance with suitability laws, regulations, and regulators' 
biases172 also presents a formidable challenge for supervisors173 and 
950 F.2ct 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991); Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 
910,918 (6th Cir. 1991); Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1989); Ken­
nedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 
F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983). The viability of a § lO(b) unsuitability claim requires 
the plaintiff to prove: 
(1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer's needs; (2) that 
the defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities were unsuited to the 
buyer's needs; (3) that the defendant recommended or purchased the unsuita­
ble securities for the buyer anyway; (4) that, with scienter, the defendant made 
material misrepresentations (or, owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose 
material information) relating to the suitability of the securities; and (5) that 
the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment on the defendant's fraudulent 
conduct. 
Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993). 
171. See generally LIFE INS. & ANNumES MODEL REG. §§ 4-7, 8(D), III NAIC 
Model Reg. Servo 613-5 to -10 (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (July 2000) (oversight duties 
and penalties); LIFE INS. DISCLOSURE MODEL REG. § 2(A), III NAIC Model Reg. Servo 
580-3 to -6 (Nat' I Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs) (Oct. 2000); NTM 99-35, supra note 11 (discuss­
ing the applicability of suitability guidelines to wholesalers); District Directors Securities 
Conference Open Forum, 13.2 REG. & COMPLIANCE ALERT 13 (1999) available at http:// 
www.nasdr.com (stating that "firms share responsibility for implementing supervisory 
procedures focused on suitability"); The Obligations of Underwriters, Brokers and 
Dealers in Distributing and Trading Securities, Particularly of New High Risk Ventures, 
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-5275, 34-9671 (July 26, 1972), reprinted in 2 Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) <JI 4506B, at 4058-59 (Mar. 16, 1988) ("[V]iolations of suitability rules may 
involve fact patterns which also would constitute violations of ... securities acts."). See 
infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of supervisory problems with 
regard to producers. 
172. See Paul Roye, Director, Variable Insurance Products: The ChaJlenges of a 
New Millennium, Keynote Address Before the ALI-ABA Conference on Life Insur­
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employeesP4 A well-founded fear of regulatory175 and civil expo­
ance Company Products: Current Securities, Tax, ERISA, and State Regulatory Issues 
(Oct. 19, 2000) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch409.htm; Paul Roye, 
Director, Understanding the Securities Products of Insurance Companies, Keynote Ad­
dress Before the Practicing Law Institute (Jan. 9, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch455.htm;Jackson.supranote16.at 348 (vague 
standards are subject to opportunistic enforcement). The Office of Compliance Inspec­
tions and Examinations ("bCIE") established by the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion oversees market conduct and sales practices. In late December, 1996, the SEC's 
Division of Enforcement and OCIE initiated inquiries focusing on replacement activi­
ties involving variable products with a particular emphasis on the suitability of premium 
financing (i.e., using existing cash values to fund premium obligations for replaced 
products). This inquiry led to an enforcement action under Section 17(a) of the Securi­
ties Act of 1933 and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 involving 
churning. In re Parkins, Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 43336 (Sept. 25, 2000), availa­
ble at 2000 WL 1375473. 
173. See Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E), 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 25,051, at 
18,084 (Dec. 12, 1990) (providing broker-dealer sanctions for failure to reasonably su­
pervise others so as to prevent violations of governing laws and regulations); see also 
Exchange Act § 15(b)(6)(A)(i), 4 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 25,055, at 18,085-6 (Aug. 
14, 1996) (providing for suspension, bar, or censure for violating supervisory obliga­
tions). See generally In re First Sees. Corp., 40 S.E.C. 589, 592-93 (1961) (spot-checking 
required to identify unsuitable sales); In re Boren & Co., 40 S.E.c. 217, 226 (1960) 
(stating that sales personnel must be actively supervised for suitability). Securities su­
pervision is affected through qualified principals. See NASD Membership & Registra­
tion Rules 1021, 1023, NASD Manual & Notices to Members (1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
Supervision, NASD Conduct 301O(a)(2), (4)-(6), NASD Manual & Notices to Members 
(1998), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?RefShow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
N.Y.S.E. Rule 342(b)(1), N.Y.S.E. Const. & Rules (CCH) 'lI 2342, at 3585 (Nov. 1993); 
NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 301 (review of customer information); NASDProvides 
Guidance on Supervisory Responsibilities, NASD Notice to Members 99-45, June 1999, 
1999 WL 33176539 (NationallFederal); NASD Regulation Provides Interpretive Gui­
dance on Registration Requirements, NASD Notice to Members 99-49, June 1999, 1999 
WL 33176543 (NationallFederal); NASD Regulation Requests Comment on Requiring 
Chief Compliance Officers To Be Registered, NASD Notice to Members 99-51, June 
1999, 1999 WL 33176545 (NationallFederal). See generally In re Chancellor Capital 
Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release. No. IA-1447, 57 S.E.C. Docket 2204 
(Oct. 18, 1994), available at 1994 WL 570098; In re Feldman, Exchange Act Release No. 
33-7014, 55 S.E.c. Docket 9 (Sept. 20, 1993), available at 1993 WL 370958; In re Gut­
freund, Exchange Act Release No. 34-1554, 52 S.E.C. Docket 2849 (Dec. 3,1992), avail­
able at 1992 WL 362753; Simon M. Lome, Administrative Actions Against Lawyers 
Before the SEC, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association Bus­
iness Law Section (Aug. 1995); Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks to the National Association 
of Securities Dealers, Inc. (Oct. 5, 1993) (discussing liability of compliance officers and 
attorneys for failure to supervise). 
174. See generally Stano & Wilkerson, supra note 124; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1991) (insurer received notices and complaints of fraud); 
IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 84. In life insurance companies, su­
pervisory responsibilities can be horizontally and vertically stratified. Intra-departmen­
tal supervision of needs analysis and use of fact finders can also be broken down to 
functional categories such as direct/primary responsibility (producers, field coordinators 
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sure176 drives the development of policies and procedures intended 
to ensure supervision of producers conducting suitability analyses. 
These policies and procedures necessitate a commitment to the pro­
curement of supervisory staff capable of meeting with producers on 
a meaningful basis177 and effectively overseeing compliance.178 
and underwriting), process management (field managers and home office middle man­
agers), oversight (distribution management), monitoring/auditing (compliance and au­
dit) and interpretation/advice (law department). Unlike their securities counterparts, 
life insurance supervisors need not demonstrate their expertise by passing mastery ex­
aminations. Cf Supervision, NASD Conduct Rule 3010(a)(6), supra note 173; Regis­
tration, NASD Membership and Registration 1021, 1022, 1070, supra note 173. 
175.· See, e.g., In re Dist. Bus. Conduct Comm. v. Cruz, No. C8A930048, 1997 WL 
33101218 (Nat'l Bus. Conduct Comm. Oct. 31, 1997). 
176. See Bridget O'Brian, Prudential Fined $20 Million by NASD over Its Sales of 
Variable Life Insurance, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1999, at Cl. See generally NTM 01-23, 
supra note 11 (excessive trading and. churning are examples of unsuitable 
recommendations). 
177. Supervisors are required to conduct periodic personal meetings with all pro­
ducers no less frequently than annually, and preferably on an unannounced basis. See 
NASD Conduct Rule 3010(a)(8) & (c), supra note 173 (annual inspection of all OSJs 
and cyclical examinations of branch offices). See generally In re NYLife Secs. Inc., Ex­
change Act Release No. 34-40459, 68 S.E.c. Docket 103 (Sep. 23, 1998), available at 
1998 WL 646712 (audit customer files); In re Royal Alliance Assocs., Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-38174, 63 S.E.c. Docket 1606, (Jan. 15, 1997), available at 1997 WL 
13023 (failure to effectively supervise for reasons which included ineffective on-site au­
dit protocol); In re Conso!. Inv. Servs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-36687, 61 
S.E.C. Docket 19 (Jan. 5, 1996), available at 1996 WL 20829 (compliance question­
naires). This inspection must determine whether the agency and its personnel, whether 
centralized or detached, are complying with company policies and procedures and with 
the requirements of applicable laws and regulations. The purpose of such meeting is to, 
among other things, examine files and records for examples or patterns of possible 
problematic sales or solicitations, to provide an opportunity for producers to ask ques­
tions and receive guidance regarding compliance concerns, and to present regulatory-, 
policy- and compliance-related issues. See NASD Conduct Rule 301O(c), supra note 
173. See generally Unfair Trade Practices Act § 4(J) V NAIC Model Regulation Service 
at 880-6 (Jan. 1993) (records requirements). 
178. See IMSA Princ. 6, Question 6.1, Indicator 6.l.a.2, and Question 6.2, Indica­
tors 6.2.a.7 & 6.2.b.3, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 81, 84; FED­
ERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL §§ 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k), 8C2.5(f) (stating that a 
reduction in culpability score is based upon the presence of an "effective program to 
prevent and detect violations of law"); see also In re Conso!. Inv. Servs., Inc., 52 S.E.C. 
582 (1996) (providing analysis of the standards of reasonableness under the section 
15(b)(4)(E) safe harbor). In 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission developed a benchmark for effective internal control systems 
that included five components of control: environment, risk assessment, control activi­
ties, information and communication, and monitoring. William C. Jennings & Peter C. 
Sutherland, Internal Control Systems Help Insurers Reduce Risk, BEST'S REv. LIFE­
HEALTH INS. ED. 72 (Jan. 1996), available at 1996 WL 8831049. But see FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL, supra, § 8C2.5(f) (stating that a rebuttable pre­
sumption of ineffectiveness of compliance with the program exists where high level 
personnel participate in violations or where, after becoming aware of an offense, the 
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Manuals must be periodically updatedY9 Training,180. including 
ethics awareness181 and needs based selling,182 must also occur. 
However, the very existence of these policies and procedures cre­
ates exposure in the absence of conscientious monitoring. 
The challenge of adequately supervising producers becomes 
even more stringent as distribution channelsI83 become more dif­
fuse through detached184 and independent producers and bro­
kers.185 This contrasts with an environment in which all producers 
organization unreasonably delayed reporting the offense to appropriate governmental 
authorities). 
179. See NASD Conduct Rule 301O(b)(4), NASD Manual & Notices to Members 
(1999), available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm. 
180. See NASD Membership and Registration Rules, NASD Manual & Notices 
to Members'll 1120 (May 1999) available at 
http://secure.nasdr.comlwbsINETbos.dll?Refshow?ref=NASD4;&xinfo=/goodbye.htm; 
IMSA Princ. 2, Codes C-F, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 54-59. 
181. See 1MSA Princ. 1, Code C & IMSA Princ. 6, Code A, IMSA ASSESSMENT 
HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 48, 81. 
182. IMSA Princ. 1, Code A, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 
42. 
183. For the purposes hereof, "distribution channels" refers to the various ways 
that manufacturers use producers to solicit and sell their products. For instance, manu­
facturers may distribute their products through brokers or career agents, or they could 
distribute through channels based on the type of product or geographic region. The life 
insurance industry had traditionally used an agency system to distribute its products. 
Under this system, the manufacturer's "home office" would supervise the activities of 
"field" offices or agencies through an agency manager. In the current environment, 
however, manufacturers have either abandoned or diminished their dependence on the 
agency system. These circumstances affect the ability of home office management to 
monitor the activities of field producers. 
184. As used herein, the term "detached producers" refers to producers who sell 
products from locations other than agencies established by manufacturers or perhaps 
the home office of the manufacturer (for example, sales from a producer's home). 
Proximity of supervisors to the producers that they supervise is one measure of the 
effectiveness of supervision. See generally NASD Notice to Members 98-38, NASD 
Reminds Members of Supervisory and Inspection Obligations (May 1998) (stating that 
firms should consider the number and location of its registered principals in terms of its 
capability to effectively supervise unregistered office personnel); NASD Notice to 
Members 99-45, NASD Provides Guidance on Supervisory Responsibilities, at 300 (Jun. 
1999) (discussing one-on-one supervision requirements); NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 
303. IMSA has likewise endorsed a supervisory system modeled on NASD require­
ments. See supra note 173 and accompanying text for a discussion of this supervisory 
system. 
185. Manufacturers typically have less control over "independent producers" 
(Le., producers appointed to represent many manufacturers). Manufacturers "appoint" 
producers to sell their products in a particular state. Independent producers may also 
be contractually bound to adhere to that manufacturer's particular solicitation stan­
dards as a result of being appointed. Such contractual arrangements may allow the 
producer and manufacturer to negotiate how supervision will be affected. See 1MSA 
Princ. 6, Code B cmts.; Question 6.2, Indicator 6.1.a.4, IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, 
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work in centralized locations under the watchful eyes of their super­
visors. Supervisory mandates based on a centralized distribution 
concept could have the effect of forcing manufacturers to decide 
whether the cost of compliance is disproportionate to the cost asso­
ciated with under-supervising decentralized producers. Thus, man­
ufacturers face the difficult question of trying to appease regulators 
by adopting unenforceable or unenforced policies and leaving the 
impossible task of enforcement to ill-equipped and under-sup­
ported compliance departments. One possible solution to this di­
lemma could be to adopt an overarching suitability mission 
statement. 
One simplistic mission statement could be that producers and 
manufacturers must work together to "[s]ell the right policy to the 
right prospect in the right way."186 Criteria used to fulfill this mis­
sion then would depend on making certain decisions as an industry 
and at each level along the distribution path of product solicitation. 
First, a determination must be made whether suitability is an out­
come-oriented objective to later measure the efficacy of advice or a 
process that can be reliably measured and monitored. Once that is 
determined, other issues should be resolved. These include 
whether the rule should protect customers from producers/manu­
facturers or attempt to level the playing field among producers and 
on what basis appropriate regulatory oversight should be 
established. 
A. 	 Should Suitability Be an Outcome- or a Process-Oriented 
Objective? 
The development of any model suitability standard depends on 
supra note 44, at 83-84. The growing use of independent producers caused great diffi­
culties for insurance companies seeking 1MSA membership under its original code. The 
initial code placed many oversight responsibilities on manufacturers. See, e.g., IMSA 
Princ. 6, Code B cmt. 1, 1MSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 83 (stating 
that before allowing an independent producer to sell its products, the insurer ascertains 
the good character, business repute, qualifications, and training of the producer in ac­
cordance with IMSA Principle 2, Code A); NASD Conduct Rule 301O(e), NASD Man­
ual (CCH) 91 3010, at 4834 (Nov. 1999); IMSA Princ. 2, Code A, 1MSA ASSESSMENT 
HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 51. See generally In re Mabon, Mugent & Co., 47 S.E.C. 
862,867 (1983) (discussing supervision of sales activities); NTM 97-19, NASD Regula­
tion and New York Stock Exchange Memorandum Discusses Sweep Report and Pro­
vides Guidance on Heightened Supervision Recommendations (Apr. 1997). 
186. Kessler, supra note 44, at 545. See generally KREITNER, supra note 50, at 111 
(stating that doing things right the first time is a critical component of total quality 
management). 
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whether suitability is to be evaluated as a process, a process and 
structure, or measured by outcome. 
1. Process Orientation 
A process-oriented approach would attempt to ensure that as 
long as a reliable187 process was used to determine the appropriate­
ness of a recommendation, neither the producer nor the manufac­
turer would be held liable if the results failed to meet the 
customer's expectations. A process orientation should require an 
adequate "top-down" commitment to the process, and a willingness 
to discipline any non-compliant producer. This approach also de­
pends on a series of accepted "norms" which would need to be es­
tablished in the financial services industry for each manufacturer 
and producer. This approach could be criticized, however, on the 
basis that the use of norms stifles autonomy and creativity. An­
other criticism of a process orientation is that an unsatisfied cus­
tomer may have no recourse against a producer who followed the 
process of determining the suitability of their recommendations. 
2. Process and Structure Orientation 
An alternative to a pure process orientation would be to estab­
lish a process and structure orientation. This type of orientation 
would incorporate all of the process considerations noted above, 
but also add the concept of checks and balances through the inclu­
sion of various hierarchical forms of supervision. The NASD ap­
proach to broker-dealer supervision generally embraces this type of 
approach.188 For instance, the broker-dealer would first adopt a 
compliance code that addresses suitability as an important consider­
ation.189 Product manufacturers could also develop their own inter­
nal requirements for confirming the suitability of recommendations 
in connection with new product sales and replacements.190 Supervi­
sory chains would then be deployed to oversee that these com­
mandments are complied with and that repercussion's follow from 
non-compliance191 as suggested by the NASD and IMSA.192 One 
drawback to this approach is that it might not be appropriate for 
187. See generally KREITNER, supra note 50, at 109. 
188. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NASD 
supervisory structure. 
189. See supra note 178. 
190. See supra notes 95-96, 177. 
191. See supra note 178. 
192. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text. 
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new or novel distribution channels. For example, a hierarchical su­
pervisory structure may be alien to banks that have historically 
given platform customer service representatives the exclusive au­
thority to oversee their own suitability analysis. 
3. Outcome Orientation 
Another alternative would be to develop a standard based en­
tirely on outcomes. Under such an approach, the appropriate in­
quiry would be whether the customer was harmed in any way by the 
recommendation. Obviously, public confidence could be bolstered 
by such a standard. There are good reasons, however, why out­
comes should not be the primary measure of suitability. First, the 
desired "outcome" cannot be discovered until it is too late for the 
producer or manufacturer to do anything about it. Even if pro­
ducer and customer expectations appear to be aligned at the time of 
sale (i.e. through commissions for the producer and the prospect of 
positive returns for the customer), inherent incongruencies exist 
since the customer alone will suffer from subsequent performance 
disappointment. Moreover, an outcome orientation cannot discern 
the "trusting sweet widow" from the "greedy old lady." As dis­
cussed above, it could be argued that we have already migrated to 
an outcome orientation. However, if outcomes continue to be a 
basis to judge suitability, producers and manufactures will be and 
remain as investment intermediaries guaranteeing investment re­
sults. As a result, the cost associated with correcting the outcome 
of recommendations will continue to factor into product prices that 
will then be cross-subsidized by all other customers. 
Second, an outcome orientation does not recognize the impor­
tance of product costs and their impact on how customers may 
make their investment decisions.193 A broader range of ostensibly 
suitable products usually exists than a customer may be able to af­
ford. The customer's value perception of whether any alternative 
product is "affordable," "affordable with strain," or "unaffordable" 
may lead to vastly different outcomes. These perceptions are also 
dependent upon the customer's sense of urgency at the moment of 
solicitation. For instance, most people would say that they would 
buy as much insurance as possible if they thought that they would 
die tomorrow. If they thought that they might live just a little bit 
193. See generally DIREcr RESPONSE, supra note 16 (stating that sixty-eight per­
cent of respondents indicated that cost of insurance was the most important factor in 
their buying decision). 
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longer, however, this assumption may no longer hold true. A pure 
outcome orientation that includes this, and other subjective cus­
tomer decisions, therefore leads the financial services industry no 
further than their present stead. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that an outcome orienta­
tion may be best suited for egregious cases involving outright fraud 
and material misrepresentations. Accordingly, fact patterns involv­
ing these factors should continue to frame the "easy" cases involv­
ing suitability. 
B. Whom Should Suitability Protect? 
Not all customers may need protection against their own in­
vestment decisions. For instance, many securities regulators ac­
knowledge that "sophisticated" customers seem to be able to fend 
for themselves.194 In an environment where a great deal of finan­
cial data is now readily available in the public domain, should all 
other customers be entitled to second-guess their decisions? 
"Boiler-room" sales cases involving high pressure tactics used by 
some unscrupulous stock brokers may have led to the establishment 
of a sympathetic "little old widow" benchmark. In reality, the rea­
sonably prudent person would make a more reliable standard.195 
This lowest common denominator approach is therefore flawed be­
cause those people who, despite disclosures, still cannot adequately 
fathom the nature of their investment would require an unlimited 
number of other protections against a producer and themselves.196 
C. Leveling the Playing Field Among Producers 
The present environment, where different producers are sub­
ject to different suitability duties, creates an unfair advantage to 
less-regulated producers. The "best advice" standard adopted in 
the United Kingdom presents one model for leveling the playing 
field among these different types of producers. English solicitation 
194. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the sophisticated securities customer. 
195. See generally Marc A. ,Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Is­
sues, Reform Proposals and Trade-Offs, 32 Hous. L. REV. 1319,1363-66 (1996) (stating 
that the Federal Trade Commission's authority to prohibit "unfair" practices is pre­
mised on a "reasonable" purchaser standard is appropriate relative to insurance, securi­
ties and managed care). 
196. See generally Csordas v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., No. CI91­
1764,1992 WL 426460, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Juiy 16, 1992) ("[T]he broker must explain to 
the customer the risks of purchasing a security in such a way that would enable the 
customer to relate the risks of the transaction to his risk threshold and thus make the 
independent determination himself of whether or not to purchase the security."). 
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regulations were developed in the early 1980s following a series of 
market conduct scandals.197 The Financial Services Act ("Code") 
of 1986198 led to the establishment of self-regulatory organiza­
tions.199 The United Kingdom regulator, the Financial Services Au­
thority, and its predecessor, LAUTRO (Life Assurance and Unit 
Trust Regulatory Organisation), have imposed significant fines and 
penalties for breaches of the Code.2°O 
The "Conduct of Business Rules"201 were intended to "pro­
mote high standards of integrity and fair dealing" by representa­
tives while interacting with customers, and to "make proper 
provision for requiring an authorised person to act with due skill, 
care, and diligence ...."202 The Code addresses producer conduct 
with a potential customer. The Financial Services Authority also in­
troduced the concept of "polarisation," which means that any sales 
representative must either be independent (i.e., a broker in the 
United States) and be able to demonstrate independence ("Inde­
pendent Financial Advisers")203 or, alternatively, must be a repre­
sentative of only one company, selling only products of his or her 
host company (so-called "tied advisors" or "appointed representa­
tives").204 This allegiance disclosure also exists, for example, for 
Connecticut real estate brokers or salespersons who must disclose 
their affiliation with either the property buyer or seller205 in a 
signed written statement before the first personal meeting with 
prospects.206 
U.K. regulations apply a "best advice" standard only to inde­
197. See generally Ross JONES, UK REGULATION (LIMRA International 1997) 
(discussing the development of insurance brokers regulations in the United Kingdom). 
198. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60 (Eng.). 
199. Id. § 48; see also id. §§ 10, 15 (1986); JONES, supra note 197, at 6. 
200. See, e.g., Alison Smith, Life Insurers Face Jump in Fines, THE FINANCIAL 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 1993 (stating that fines expected to start at more than £200,000); Carol 
O'Leary, UK: Insurers Fail Lautro Test, LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 19, 1994 
(noting that Norwich Union suspended all its 800 insurance salesmen in response to 
being fined £325,000, including costs); Robert Miller, Life Insurers Face Swinging Fines, 
LONDON TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994 (stating that some of Britain's leading life insurance com­
panies have been subject to fines, which together with costs, would top £500,000). 
201. Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 48 (Eng.). 
202. Id. sch. 8, §§ 1-2. 
203. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY GUIDE TO FrNANCIAL ADVICE 13 (May 
2000) (discussing two main types of financial advisers), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/index-chrono-2oo0.html [hereinafter FSA GUIDE]. 
204. Id. 
205. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20"325d (2001). 
206. Id.· 
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pendent financial advisers.207 These representatives must take into 
account all aspects of a customer's circumstances when giving ad­
vice.208 Customer information and recommendations are typically 
recorded on a "fact find."209 The independent financial adviser 
must only recommend a product that is suitable, taking into account 
the customer's circumstances.210 Independent financial advisers 
must not recommend any contract if none is suitable-a closest fit 
is not acceptable.211 The independent financial adviser must also 
reasonably believe that there is no other investment or product that 
is likely to secure the customer's investment objectives "more 
advantageously. "212 
The U.K. customer must be given sufficient information to 
make an informed decision.213 For example, the independent finan­
cial adviser must give a "key features" disclosure containing a gen­
eral description of the particular product that is being 
recommended, including charges, policy benefits, and any associ­
ated risks.214 This disclosure is intended to be a "short and punchy 
synopsis of the product which is easy to read and capable of being 
understood by the investor."215 Commissions or other remunera­
tion must also be disclosed upon request, or, in any case, prior to 
completion of the application.216 Finally, a "reason why" letter pro­
207. See PERSONAL INVESTMENT AUTHORITY LIMITED, PIA RULE BOOK, 
ADOPTED SIB (CONDUCT OF BUSINESS) RULE, § 5.02 (June 1997) [hereinafter PIA 
RULE BOOK]; Robert W. Stein, Product Suitability Looms As Market Conduct Hurdle, 
97 BEST'S REv. LIFE-HEALTH INS., Dec. 1, 1996, available at 1996 WL 13935485; Hill 
Gallagher, Learning from the U.K.'s Disclosure Experience, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE 
& HEALTH-FIN. SERVICES., Feb. 3, 1997, available at 1997 WL 9318794 ("[I]f one com­
pany is getting a disproportionate share of an agent's business, that agent will be re­
quired to demonstrate that 'best advice' was given in cases involving that insurer"). 
208. See PIA RULE BOOK, supra note 207, § 3.01 (May 1995). 
209. JONES, supra note 197, at 9. A fact finding is not required for unsolicited 
sales. [d. 
210. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 4 (Eng.); PIA RULE BOOK, supra 
note 207, §§ 5.01-5.02. 
211. See Stein, supra note 207. 
212. PIA RULE BOOK, supra note 207, § 5.02(1); cf id. § 5.03. 
213. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 7 (Eng.). 
214. FSA GUIDE, supra note 203, at 13. The Key Features Disclosure must in­
clude projected benefits illustrations, projected surrender values over the first five 
years, and subsequent quinquennial years to maturity, a description of the effects of 
deductions and an overall description of the policy. See KPMG PEAT MARWICK, IN­
SURANCE BULLETIN LIFE ASSURANCE PRODUCT AND COMMISSION DISCLOSURE -THE 
NEW RULES 2 (June 1994). 
215. TILLINGHAST INSURANCE UPDATE, NEW PRODUCT DISCLOSURE RULES, 2 
(July 1, 1994). 
216. See Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, § 5 (Eng.); PIA RULE BOOK, supra 
note 207, § 5.13; see also KPMG PEAT MARWICK, supra note 214, at 3; Gallagher, supra 
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vides full details of the advantages and disadvantages of any poten­
tial replacement must be given no later than the cancellation 
notice.217 
While the U.K. best advice system led to criticism,218 there is 
an appeal to forcing an allegiance disclosure at the onset of solicita­
tion activities. Such a standard is also generally consistent with the 
existing duties of U.S. property insurance brokers to find the best 
available coverage219 and the overall recognition in U.S. agency law 
of the loyalty of a broker as compared to an agent.220 
D. Who Should Oversee Suitability? 
The concept of functional regulation within the Gramm-Leach­
Bliley Act sets one possible framework for the consolidation of reg­
ulatory oversight.221 The United Kingdom best advice system pro­
vides an alternative model based on a centralized self-regulatory 
authority overseeing sales. By way of comparison, the Connecticut 
Department of Consumer Protection oversees real estate agent dis­
cipline regardless of the type of recommendation involved.222 Simi­
larly, quality oversight deployed by Managed Care Organizations 
(MCOs) provides another possible structure for regulating the effi­
cacy of recommendations.223 
note 207 (noting that disclosure of acquisition costs rather than commissions would be 
more meaningful to consumers). 
217. KPMG PEAT MARWlCK, supra note 214, at 2; see also Financial Services Act, 
1986, sch. 8, § 5 (Eng.). 
218. NANCY D. BOYNTON, LIMRA INTERNATIONAL INC., BEYOND THE WAVE­
MARKET CONDUCT IN A MARKET SEA CHANGE 6-8 (1996) (stating that in the year in 
which disclosure regulations first went into effect, the number of new policies sold in 
the U.K. dropped to the lowest point since the 1970's). See generally Gallagher, supra 
note 207 (stating that the cost of doing business by independents increased as syndicates 
charged fees to perform due diligence on possible product recommendations). 
219. See generally HOLMES, supra note 125, at 423 (noting that once a heightened 
standard of care is found to exist, the producer may have a duty to procure the best 
available coverage); Darner Motor Sales Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 
P.2d 388, 403 n.14 (Ariz. 1984) ("'[Clompany agents' are held to a somewhat lower 
standard than 'independent agents' ...."). 
220. See Eglin & Rogers, supra note 125, at 113-15; HOLMES, supra note 125, at 
425-37. 
221. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 133 Stat. 1338 (1999) (providing 
that insurance activities of any persons shall be "functionally" regulated by the states); 
see also Jackson, supra note 16, at 387-98 (analyzing functional regulation). 
222. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-311a(a), b(2) (1999). 
223. The health field has historically been concerned about the quality of its ser­
vices to patients. See David Blumenthal, The Origins of the Quality-of-Care Debate, 335 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1146 (1996); David Blumenthal, Quality of Care - What Is It?, 335 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 891 (1996); Robert H. Brook et ai., Measuring Quality of Care, 335 
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One particular appeal of the MCO system may lie in its defer­
ence to professional peers to assess the effectiveness of utilization 
review programs.224 The MCO industry has also submitted to pri­
vate accrediting to increase consumer confidence.225 These quality 
assurance initiatives, bolstered by the recent passage of a "con­
sumer bill of rights,"226 could provide significant inspiration to the 
financial services industry. Applying this approach, there are op­
portunities for IMSA to model itself after the National Committee 
for Quality Assurance227 or similar self-regulated credentialing au­
thorities. These initiatives could also be combined with peer suita­
bility review228 based on a consumer bill of rights, thereby ensuring 
both a commitment by producers to conduct an adequate suitability 
analysis and a consumer's obligation to assume accountability for 
becoming as familiar as possible with the consequences of his or her 
investment decisions. 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 966 (1996); Mark R. Chassin, Improving the Quality of Care, 335 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1060 (1996); David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do 
Less: Financial Incentives to Limit Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 155, 156-58 (1996). The 
relatively recent advent of managed care organizations (MCOs) has accentuated the 
conflict between patient care and cost containment measures. The service provider in 
these organizations is presently challenged to defend both the efficacy and the cost 
effectiveness of his or her advice. 
224. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-17C-41 (Michie 1999). 
225. See sources cited supra note 217. 
226. See Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the 
Health Care Industry, Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, Report to the 
President of the United States (Nov. 1997), available at http://www.hcqualitycommis­
sion.gov/cborr/. 
227. The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) is a private, not­
for-profit organization dedicated to assessing and reporting on the quality of managed 
care plans. The NCQA accredits MCOs through a voluntary program. NCQA cur­
rently uses Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), a standardized 
performance measurement matrix, to ensure that customers have certain information 
needed to compare MCOs. HEDIS 2000 contains fifty-six measures, seventeen of which 
are dedicated to effectiveness of care.). Diagnostics are considered as well as mecha­
nisms used to ensure consistent review. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 58-17C-37(2), 
(4), (5) (2000). The utilization review program itself is also periodically evaluated to 
assure ongoing efficiency and continued improvement. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 58-17C-38 (2000). It is interesting to note that the self-evaluation aspects contem­
plated by this process represented a significant impediment to the life insurance indus­
try's acceptance of the 1MSA self-evaluation process. The adoption of a limited 
privilege for such assessments in states such as Illinois represents the type of protections 
thought to be so essential in the life insurance industry. See, e.g., 215 ILL. COMPo STAT. 
5/155.35 (2001). 
228. See generally Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assess­
ment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1674-81 (1992) (stating that a de 
novo review standard would be preferable to ex post judicial assessments). 
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E. Managing Customer Expectations 
Whatever standard emerges, or even if no standard emerges, 
producers should be encouraged to manage customer expectations 
at the time of solicitation and, ideally, throughout the duration of 
their relationship. Managing customer expectations is a multi-step 
process that starts with a producer matching his or her knowledge 
of the customer's needs, aspirations, and risk tolerance with his or 
her presumably thorough knowledge of his or her preferred manu­
facturer's products, and others available in the marketplace.229 
Suitability is, and will remain, a process of finding a range of 
products that may satisfy a customer's needs and objectives to vary­
ing degrees. Producers would therefore be well served by having 
the confidence of their convictions and presenting these alternatives 
in a balanced manner that would allow customers to evaluate the 
products before making any purchase. 
Managing customer expectations through this form of in­
formed consent230 is not necessarily intended to totally eliminate 
possible suitability claims. Reasonably prudent customers should 
bear the ultimate financial consequences when their educated in­
vestment decisions turn out other than expected.231 The threat of 
229. This point is exemplified by NTM 99-35, supra note 11, and NTM 00-44, 
supra note 10, at 301-02, which both warn producers that they must have a thorough 
knowledge of the specifications of each variable product recommended. IMSA Princi­
ple 2, Code D also requires that producers have "adequate knowledge" of products and 
their operation. IMSA ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 44, at 56. See generally 
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 595-96 (2d Cir. 1969) (stating that for a registered repre­
sentative to have the requisite reasonable basis for believing that a particular security is 
appropriate for any investor, the broker-dealer must have performed due diligence on 
the security); In re F. J. Kaufman & Co., 50 S.E.C. 164 (1989) (requiring producers to 
know their "transaction" as well as their customer); Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 
527 (N.J. 1991) (quoting Rider v. Lynch, 201 A.2d 561 (N.J. 1964». 
230. See NTM 00-44, supra note 10, at 302--03; NASD Investors' Best Practices 
(unsuitability), available at http://www.nasdr.com:80/4300_page_2.htm. 
231. See Booth, supra note 9, at 1605. 

[T)he question remains how to distinguish cases of genuine broker misbehav­

ior from cases in which the investor has lost fair and square. After all, invest­

ing is risky business and, therefore, investors should expect to lose sometimes. 

A broker cannot be expected to insure success. Thus, mere mistakes of judg­
ment should not suffice to allow investor recovery even if the requisite rela­
tionship of trust and confidence can be shown . . .. 
. . . . [A)n investor may be disserved when the broker causes the investor to 
take on additional risk absent a clear decision by the investor to do so, or at 
the very least, the informed consent of the investor. In other words, the bro­
ker should be liable when the broker increases the risk level of an investor's 
portfolio without at least the consent of the investor. 
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exposure; however, should continue to loom for those producers 
who take advantage of the asymmetry of knowledge between them 
and their customer, as well as in those instances in which an over­
bearing producer implicitly or explicitly induces (i.e., over-sells) the 
product based on his or her overt actions, course of ~onduct, or 
prior history with the customer. 
CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, given the tenor of the debate thus far, it is 
highly improbable that the financial services industry will embrace 
a universal standard that harmonizes existing suitability standards. 
More likely, the insurance industry and the NAIC will continue to 
debate a model regulation that ignores securities law suitability 
standards for reasons such as: (a) the fundamental differences that 
exist between variable and traditional products as to perceptions 
about risk; (b) the infungibility of "needs" t6 be considered; (c) the 
existence of other market conduct protections; and (d) the fact that 
using a "recommendation" as the trigger for applying standards is 
too vague.232 Ironically, securities and banking regulators could ul­
timately force a standard upon the insurance industry through the 
broad powers vested under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley ACt.233 In the 
end, the insurance industry's failure to reach consensus may lead to 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
232. See, e.g., Steven Brostoff, NAIC and Legislators Vow: No NARAB, in NAT'L 
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALlH 1 (Apr. 17, 2000); Letter from Ronald J. Panneton, 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. and Financial Advisors, to Carolyn J. Johnson 
(Feb. 6, 2001) (on file with author). It has also been argued that state insurance depart­
ment approval of certain policy forms mitigates the need for a suitability requirement 
presumably on the assumption that the insurance commissioner would not approve 
anti-consumer products. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. DEPT., supra note 40, at 7; Letter from 
Donald J. Walters to Carolyn J. Johnson, supra note 41, at 2. 
233. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also evidences disparate deference to federal or state securi­
ties on one hand, and state insurance regulators on the other. See generally id. 
§ 104(f)(-1) (preserving the absolute jurisdiction of securities commissions to prevent 
fraud and oversee licensure or registration of brokers, dealers, and investment advi­
sors); id. § 104(f)(2) (preserving the jurisdiction of state blue sky, corporate, and anti­
trust regulators provided such laws or actions were not "inconsistent with the purposes 
of this Act"); id. § 305(g)(1)(B) (providing that state insurance regulatory authority is 
subject to federal banking agency consumer protection regulations and preemption pro­
visions). Cf id. § 323 (stating that one of the purposes of NARAB, if implemented, is 
to "preserv[e] the right of States to license, supervise, and discipline insurance produc­
ers and to prescribe and enforce laws and regulations with regard to insurance-related 
consumer protection and unfair trade practices."). But see id. § 307(a) (instructing the 
Federal Reserve Board and state insurance regulators to share information in order to 
encourage efficiency and quality supervision). 
2002] MY CUSTOMER'S KEEPER 95 

forced submission of a regulatory scheme that could favor securities 
brokers and bankers over insurance agents.234 
Securities suitability standards and their litigious history pro­
vide many insights. Beyond their applicability to hybrid products, 
these standards affirm the existence of an informed consent stan­
dard where, in the proper circumstances, reasonably capable cus­
tomers can assume responsibility for the outcomes of their 
investment decisions.235 Managing client expectations should not 
absolve producers, as experts, from their obligation to educate their 
customers about pertinent features of all recommended and other­
wise available products, as well as the existence of possible conflicts 
of interest. However, contrary to present practice, a process and 
structure orientation to suitability would help establish a relatively 
ascertainable point at the conclusion of the solicitation process. At 
that time, absent discretionary authority, the producer (as well as 
his or her supervisors and product manufacturers) could reasonably 
conclude that he or she has conducted an appropriate and thorough 
inquiry as to the customer's investment objectives, financial situa­
tion, knowledge, and financial experience. The producer therefore 
has a reasonable basis to believe that the customer (a) has taken 
reasonable measures to evaluate the risks. associated with the rec­
ommended product (in isolation and in terms of his or her overall 
holdings and other products), whether individually or with the assis­
tance of other qualified advisors; and (b) has the financial capability 
to bear the potential consequences flowing from such purchase. 
The present and future financial services industry has, and will 
continue to have, a dizzying array of distribution channels for advi­
sory services and products. Separate standards for each type of 
product, producer, or site of sale are simply unworkable. Given the 
already somewhat tarnished public image of the insurance salesper­
son, it is easy to surmise why the insurance industry had better get 
234. Id. § 321(b)(4); see alsO id. § 321(b)(1) (providing uniform licenSing regard­
ing qualification and training of producers "in ascertaining the appropriateness tof a 
particular insurance product for a prospective purchaser"). Uniform licensing require­
ments that include suitability criteria may be averted if a majority of states establish 
either "uniform" or "reciprocal" producer licensing provisions by November 12, 2002. 
§ 321(a). According to the NAIC, 46 states have passed legislation or adopted regula­
tions attempting to satisfy this requirement. If these laws and regulations have truly 
established "uniform criteria" that ensures "that an insurance product ... sold to a 
customer is suitable and appropriate for the customer based on financial information 
disclosed by the customer," § 321(b)(4), then-in theory-a multi-state suitability stan­
dard now exists. 
235. See Gibson, supra note 22, at 571-81 (stating that institutional investors 
should assume investment risk associated with derivatives). 
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its house in order fast. Missing this historic opportunity may be the 
harbinger of a new era of financial service provider "Darwinism." 
In such a new world where old style insurance producer "relation­
ship-ists" become extinct in favor of new style "transactional-ist" 
producers, there remains the final question: Who then, if anyone, 
will be his or her customer's keeper? 
